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Abstract
We measure the behavior of 1,114 CEOs in Brazil, France, Germany, India, UK and US
using a new methodology that combines (i) data on every activity the CEOs undertake during
one workweek and (ii) a machine learning algorithm that projects these data onto scalar CEO
behavior indices. Low values of the index are associated with plant visits, and one-on-one
meetings with production or suppliers, while high values correlate with meetings with high-level
C-suite executives, and several functions together, both from inside and outside the firm. We
use these data to study the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance within
the framework of a firm-CEO assignment model. We show results consistent with significant
firm-CEO assignment frictions, which appear to be more severe in lower-income regions. The
productivity loss generated by ine cient assignment is equal to 13% of the productivity gap
between high- and low-income countries in our sample.
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1 Introduction
The impact of CEOs on firm performance is at the core of many economic debates. The conventional
wisdom, backed by a growing body of empirical evidence (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Bennedsen
et al. 2007, Kaplan et al. 2012) is that the identity of the CEO matters for firm performance.
But what do CEOs actually do? Coase (1937) formalized the role of the CEO primarily as the
coordination of activities performed by di↵erent individuals in the firm, and by relevant parties
outside of it. Yet coordination can be achieved in di↵erent ways. Do di↵erent CEOs perform this
role di↵erently? And is there a “best practice”, or do di↵erent circumstances call for di↵erent CEO
behaviors?
In this paper we develop a new methodology to measure CEO behavior in large samples com-
bining: (i) a survey that records each activity the CEOs undertake during one week; and (ii) a
machine learning algorithm that projects the many dimensions of observed CEO behavior onto a
one-dimensional behavior index. We then use this index to study the correlation between CEO
behavior and firm performance within the framework of a firm-CEO assignment model.
Our survey methodology is inspired by the classic study by Mintzberg (1973), who shadowed
five CEOs over the course of one week. We scale up this methodology by calling the CEOs or their
PAs to record the CEOs’ diaries, rather than shadowing individuals directly. This approach allows
us to collect comparable data on the behavior of 1,114 CEOs of manufacturing firms in six countries
at di↵erent stages of development: Brazil, France, Germany, India, UK and the US. Overall, we
collect data on 42,233 activities covering an average of 50 working hours per CEO. We record the
same five features for each activity: its type (e.g. meeting, plant/shop-floor visits, business lunches
etc.), planning horizon, number of participants involved, number of di↵erent functions, and the
participants’ function (e.g. finance, marketing, clients, suppliers, etc.).1
We find that CEOs’ behavior di↵ers considerably along all five features. In particular, while
the majority of CEOs spend most of their time in meetings, they di↵er in the extent to which their
focus is on firms’ employees vs. outsiders, and within the former, whether they mostly interact
with high-level executives vs. production employees. CEOs also di↵er in how they organize these
interactions in terms of duration, number of people involved, number of functions these people
represent and planning horizon. We also show that these dimensions of time use are correlated so
that, for instance, CEOs who focus on production also tend to have short, one-to-one meetings.
To fully capture the heterogeneity and correlation structure of the data, we use an unsuper-
vised Bayesian machine learning algorithm, the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei et al. 2003), that
projects the high-dimensional feature space onto a one-dimensional CEO behavior index. Low val-
ues of the index are associated with CEOs who spend more time with production, and one-on-one
1In earlier work (Bandiera et al. 2013) we use the same data to measure the CEOs’ labor supply and assess whether
and how it correlates with di↵erences in corporate governance (and in particular whether the firm is led by a family
CEO).
2
meetings with firm employees or suppliers. In contrast, high values of the index are associated with
more time spent with C-suite executives, several participants and multiple functions from both
inside and outside the firm.
While the diary data reveal that di↵erent CEOs behave di↵erently, there is no theoretical reason
to expect either type of behavior to be associated with better firm performance. Rather, the fact
that such heterogeneity exists might be symptomatic of the fact that di↵erent types of firms require
CEOs to behave di↵erently. We formalize this idea in a simple model of firm-CEO assignment with,
potentially, screening frictions and imperfect governance. The model is based on the assumption
that firms and CEOs have heterogeneous types, and that a correct firm-CEO assignment results in
better firm performance.
The model shows that a correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance can emerge
in equilibrium for two very di↵erent reasons. First, the correlation may simply capture di↵erences
in firms’ unobservable “innate” productivity levels—i.e. more productive firms may systematically
hire CEOs with certain behavioral traits (or influence them to behave in a specific way). Impor-
tantly, however, a non-zero correlation may also reflect su ciently severe assignment frictions. To
see this, consider the scenario in which performance di↵erences across firms are fully observable,
so that the role of unobservable firm traits discuss above is irrelevant. In this case, if all CEOs
are assigned to the correct type of firm, the correlation between CEO behavior and performance
conditional on firm observables would be zero. In contrast, if assignment frictions are large, the
misassigned CEOs would be associated with worse firm performance in the cross section. In other
words, assignment frictions are necessary to generate the variation in the data needed to identify a
non-zero correlation between CEO behavior and performance.
Using firm-level accounting data matched to our CEO index, we reject the null hypothesis of
no correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance: high values of the CEO behavior
index are significantly correlated with higher firm productivity, a key metric of firm performance
(Syverson 2011). A standard deviation increase in the CEO behavior index is associated with a 0.07
log points increase in productivity, which is about 10% of the increase associated with a standard
deviation increase in capital.
Focusing on the subset of firms for which we have productivity data before and after the
appointment of the current CEO we establish that: (1) firms that eventually appoint high-index
and low-index CEOs exhibit similar changes in productivity before appointment; (2) firms that hire
a high-index CEO experience a larger increase in productivity after the CEO appointment relative
to firms that hire a low-index CEO; (3) this di↵erential e↵ect on productivity materializes three
years after the CEO is in o ce (even when we restrict the sample to the subset of CEOs whose
behavior is measured in our survey in their first three years of tenure). These three patterns allay
the concern that the correlations we observe are solely due to unobservable and time invariant firm
traits, and are consistent with the presence of assignment frictions.
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Furthermore, we exploit the regional variation present in our data to show that the correlation
between CEO behavior and firm performance is much stronger in lower-income countries and lower-
income regions within countries. In light of the model, this finding can be interpreted in two ways:
either firms in poorer regions are better able to shape the behavior of the CEO, or assignment
frictions are larger in these areas. The within-firm findings discussed above, as well as evidence
pointing to the presence of significant shortage of human capital and poor quality of corporate
governance in the two low-income countries in our sample (Brazil and India), provide in our view
further support to the assignment friction interpretation.
Building on these results, in the last part of the paper we directly estimate the model to shed
light on two issues. First, is there a best practice in CEO behavior, that is: would all firms
be more productive with high-index CEOs? Second, we quantify the productivity losses due to
misassignment and compute the share of the productivity gap between rich and poor countries that
can be attributed to CEO misassignments. Our estimates indicate that, while low-index CEOs are
optimal for some of the sample firms, their supply generally overstrips demand, such that 17% of
the firms end up with the “wrong” CEO. These ine cient assignments are more frequent in poorer
countries (36% vs 5%). The productivity loss generated by the misallocation of CEOs to firms
equals 13% of the labor productivity gap between high and low income countries.
This study contributes a new method to measure CEO behavior in large samples and evidence on
the link between CEO behavior and firm performance. The management literature provides some
examples of time-use analysis, but typically on much smaller samples and for managers on lower
rungs of the hierarchy.2 In economics, our findings are complementary to the literature that studies
the correlation between CEO personality traits and firm performance, rather than behavior. Kaplan
et al. (2012) and Kaplan and Sorensen (2016) have detailed data on skills and personality traits of
several CEOs candidates; they show the CEOs mostly di↵er along three dimensions: managerial
talent, execution skills, and interpersonal skills. Of these, only talent and execution skills correlate
with firm performance but interpersonal skills increase the likelihood that the candidate is hired.3
This is consistent with our model assumption that screening is imperfect, and that firms can end
up hiring the wrong CEO. Our methodology is complementary to Mullins and Schoar (2013), who
use self-reported survey questions to measure the management style and values of 800 CEOs in
emerging economies. Their focus however di↵ers from ours, as they aim to explain variation in
style and values rather than the link with performance.
The paper is also related to a growing literature documenting the role of managers and man-
agement processes on firm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007 and Bloom et al. 2016). The
relationship between CEO behavior and firm performance that we identify is of the same order of
2For instance Kotter (1999) covers 15 general managers and Luthans (1988) 44 mostly middle managers. Profes-
sional surveys (e.g. McKinsey 2013) sometimes collect recall data on aggregate time use.
3Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier and Tate (2009) focus on overconfidence; they find that this is
correlated with higher investment–cash flow sensitivity and mergers that destroy value.
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magnitude as the correlation with management practices. Furthermore, for a subset of our firms
we have both CEO behavior data and management scores (measured at middle managerial levels)
and we are able to check that those variables are correlated, but retain independent explanatory
power, thus suggesting that they might reflect two distinct channels through which managerial
choices influence firm performance. Finally, we share the objective of Lippi and Schivardi (2014)
to quantify the output reduction caused by distortions in the allocation of managerial talent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the machine learning
algorithm. Section 3 presents the assignment model, which informs the empirical analysis in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 quantifies the share of misassignments and their consequences for productivity
di↵erentials. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring CEO Behavior
2.1 The Sample
The sample covers CEOs in six of the world’s ten largest economies: Brazil, France, Germany, India,
the United Kingdom and the United States. For comparability, we chose to focus on established
market economies and opted for a balance between high- and middle-to-low-income countries. We
interview the highest-ranking authority in charge of the organization who has executive powers and
reports to the board of directors. While titles may di↵er across countries (e.g. Managing Director
in the UK), we refer to them as CEOs in what follows.
Our sampling frame was randomly drawn from the set of firms classified in the manufacturing
sector in the accounting database ORBIS, for a total of 6,527 eligible firms in 32 two-digit SIC
industries.4 Of these, 1,114 (17%) participated in the survey,5 of which 282 are in Brazil, 115 in
France, 125 in Germany, 356 in India, 87 in the UK and 149 in the US.
Table A.1 shows that sample firms have on average lower log sales (coe cient 0.071, standard
error 0.011) but we do not find any significant selection e↵ect on performance variables, such as labor
productivity (sales over employees) and return on capital employed (ROCE) (see the Appendix for
details).
Table A.2 shows descriptive statistics on the sample CEOs and their firms. Sample CEOs are
51 years old on average, nearly all (96%) are male and have a college degree (92%). About half
4This set was derived from 11,500 potential sample firms with available employment and sales data. We could find
CEO contact details for 7,744 firms and, of these, 1,217 later resulted not to be eligible. The reasons for non-eligibility
included recent bankruptcy or the company’s not being in manufacturing. 310 of the 1,217 could not be contacted
to verify eligibility before the project ended.
5This figure is at the higher end of response rates for CEO surveys, which range between 9% and 16% (Graham
et al. (2013)). 1,131 CEOs agreed to participate but 17 dropped out before the end of the data collection week for
personal reasons.
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of them have an MBA. The average tenure is 10 years, with a standard deviation of 9.55 years.6
Finally, sample firms are very heterogeneous in size and sales values.
2.2 The Survey
To measure CEOs’ behavior we develop a new survey tool that allows a large team of enumerators
to record in a consistent and comparable way all the activities the CEO undertakes in a given day.
Data are collected through daily phone calls with their personal assistant (PA), or with the CEO
himself (43% of the cases). We record diaries over a week that we chose based on an arbitrary
ordering of firms. Enumerators collected daily information on all the activities the CEO planned
to undertake that day as well as those actually done.7 On the last day of the data collection,
the enumerator interviewed the CEO to validate the activity data (if collected through his PA)
and to collect information on the characteristics of the CEO and of the firm. Figure A.1 shows a
screenshot of the survey tool.8 The survey collects information on all the activities lasting longer
than 15 minutes in the order they occurred during the day. To avoid under (over) weighting long
(short) activities we reshape the data so that the unit of analysis is a 15-minute time block.
Overall we collect data on 42,233 activities of di↵erent duration, equivalent to 225,721 15-
minute blocks, 90% of which cover work activities.9 The average CEO has 202 15-minute time
blocks, adding up to 50 hours per week on average.
2.3 The Data
Figure 1, Panel A shows that, in line with the Coase (1937) view of the CEO as coordinator, the
average CEO spends 70% of his time interacting with others (either face to face via meetings or
plant visits, or “virtually” via phone, videoconferences or emails). The remaining 30% is allocated
to activities that support these interactions, such as travel between meetings and time devoted
to preparing for meetings. Given that we cannot attribute these support activities to specific
interactions, we focus on the characteristics of the interactions themselves. For each interaction we
collect the following features: (1) type (e.g. meeting, lunch, etc.); (2) duration (30m, 1h, etc.); (3)
whether planned or unplanned; (4) number of participants; (5) functions of participants, divided
between employees of the firms or “insiders” (finance, marketing, etc.) and “outsiders” (clients,
banks, etc.).
6The heterogeneity is mostly due to the distinction between family and professional CEOs, as the former have
much longer tenures. In our sample 57% of the firms are owned by a family, 23% by disperse shareholders, 9% by
private individuals, and 7% by private equity. Ownership data is collected in interviews with the CEOs at the end
of the survey week and independently checked using several Internet sources, information provided on the company
website and supplemental phone interviews. We define a firm to be owned by an entity if this controls at least 25.01%
of the shares; if no single entity owns at least 25.01% of the share the firm is labeled as “Dispersed shareholder”.
770% of the CEOs worked 5 days, 21% worked 6 days and 9% 7 days. Analysts called the CEO after the weekend
to retrieve data on Saturdays and Sundays.
8The survey tool can also be found online on www.executivetimeuse.org.
9The non-work activities cover personal and family time during business hours.
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Panel B shows most of this interactive time is spent with insiders. This suggests that, at least
in our sample, most CEOs chose to direct their attention primarily towards internal constituencies,
rather than serving as “ambassadors” for their firms. Few CEOs spend time with insiders and
outsiders together, suggesting that, if they do build a bridge between the inside and the outside of
the firm, CEOs typically do so alone. Panel C shows the distribution of time spent with the three
most frequent insiders—production, marketing, and C-suite executives—and the three most fre-
quent outsiders—clients, suppliers, and consultants. Panel D shows most CEOs engage in planned
activities with a duration of longer than one hour with a single function. There is no marked
average tendency towards meeting with one or more than one person.
Figure 1 also reveals substantial heterogeneity underlying these average tendencies. For exam-
ple, CEOs at the bottom quartile devote just over 40% of the time to meetings whereas those at the
top quartile reach 65%; CEOs at the 3rd quartile devote over three times more time to production
than their counterparts at the first quartile; and the interdecile ranges for time with two people or
more and two functions or more are well over 50%.
Furthermore, there are systematic patterns of correlation across these distributions, as we show
in the heat map of Figure 2. This exercise reveals significant and intuitive patterns of co-occurrence.
For example, CEOs who do more plant visits spend more time with employees working on produc-
tion and suppliers. The data also shows that they tend to meet these functions one at the time,
rather than in multi-functional meetings. In contrast, CEOs who do more virtual communications
engage in fewer plant visits, spend more time with C-suite executives, and interact with large and
more diverse groups of individuals. They are also less likely to include purely operational functions
(production, marketing—among inside functions—and clients and suppliers—among outsiders) in
their interactions.
Finally, we ask whether each activity was undertaken in response to an emergency, and we are
able to measure the extent to which CEOs are able to plan ahead by comparing scheduled activities
with the activities that eventually took place. The CEOs in our sample largely set their agenda
rather than responding to shocks. We infer this from three related facts. First, the comparison
between the planned and the actual agenda shows that CEOs typically undertake all the activities
scheduled for a given day—overall just under 10% of planned activities were cancelled. Moreover,
only 4% of CEOs’ time was devoted to dealing with emergencies.
2.4 The CEO Behavior Index
The most flexible way of representing the raw data is to describe each time block as a combination
of the five distinct features measured in the data (type of activity, duration, planning horizon,
number of participants, type of functions involved). There are 4,253 unique interactive activities.
While the richness of the diary data allows us to describe CEO behavior in great detail, it makes
standard econometric analysis of the relationship between CEO behavior and performance (and of
7
Figure 1: CEO Behavior: Raw Data
Figure 2 - CEO Behavior: Raw Data
A. Activity Type B. Activity Participants, by Affiliation
C. Activity Participants, by Function D. Activity Structure
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the drivers of heterogeneity in behavior) challenging, as we have more variables (4,253) than CEOs
in our sample (1,114). At the same time, the patterns of co-occurrence in time use suggest that
one can view the high-dimensional raw activity data as being generated by a low-dimensional set of
latent managerial behaviors. The next section discusses how we construct a scalar CEO behavior
index using a widely-used machine learning algorithm.
2.4.1 Methodology
To reduce the dimensionality of the data we use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei
et al., 2003), an unsupervised machine learning algorithm for discrete data.10 Simpler techniques
like principal components analysis (PCA, an eigenvalue decomposition of the variance-covariance
matrix) or k-means clustering (which computes cluster centroids with the smallest squared distance
from the observations) are also possible, and indeed produce similar results as we discuss below.
The advantage of LDA relative to these other methods is that it is a generative model which
provides a complete probabilistic description of time-use patterns. LDA posits that the actual
behavior of each CEO is a mixture of a small number of “pure” CEO behaviors, and that the
creation of each activity is attributable to one of these pure behaviors. Another advantage of LDA
is that it naturally handles high-dimensional feature spaces, so we can admit correlations among
all combinations of the five distinct features, which are potentially significantly more complex than
the correlations between individual feature categories described in figure 2.
To be more concrete, suppose all CEOs have A possible ways of organizing each unit of their
time, which we define for short activities, and let xa be a particular activity. Let X ⌘ {x1, . . . , xA}
be the set of activities. A pure behavior k is a probability distribution  k over X that is common
to all CEOs.11
In our baseline specification, we focus on the simplest possible case in which there exist only
two possible pure behaviors:  0 and  1, and discuss alternative approaches and sensitivity of the
main results using models with more than two pure behaviors in Section 4. In this simple case, the
behavior of CEO i is given by a mixture of the two pure behaviors according to weight ✓i2[0,1],
thus the probability that CEO i generates activity a can lie anywhere between  0a and  
1
a.
12 We
refer to the weight ✓i as the behavior index of CEO i.
Figure 3 illustrates the LDA procedure. For each activity of CEO i, one of the two pure
behaviors is drawn independently given ✓i. Then, given the pure behavior, an activity is drawn
10An alternative approach would be to use a supervised learning algorithm that used variation in time use to
directly predict firm performance. This would “force” the data to explain performance. Instead, we adopt a two-step
approach in which we first identify the primary dimensions along which CEOs di↵er in their time use, and then
examine whether variation in these dimensions explains di↵erences in firm performance.
11Importantly, the model allows for arbitrary covariance patterns among features of di↵erent activities. For example,
one behavior may be characterized by large meetings whenever the finance function is involved but small meetings
whenever marketing is involved.
12In contrast, in a traditional clustering model, each CEO would be associated with one of the two pure behaviors,
which corresponds to restricting ✓i 2 {0, 1}.
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Figure 3: Data Generating Process for Activities with Two Pure Behaviors
Activity 1
. . .
Activity a
. . .
Activity A
Pure Behavior 0
 01  
0
a  
0
A
Pure Behavior 1
 11  
1
a  
1
A
CEO 1
1   1  1
. . . CEO N
1   N  N
1
Notes: This figure provides a graphical representation of the data-generating process for the time-use data. First,
CEO i chooses – independently for each individual unit of his time – one of the two pure behaviors according to a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter ✓i. The observed activity for a unit of time is then drawn from the distribution
over activities that the pure behavior defines.
according to its associated distribution (either  0 or  1). So, the probability that CEO i assigns
to activity xa is  ia ⌘ (1  ✓i) 0a + ✓i 1a.
If we let ni,a be the number of times activity a appears in the time use of CEO i, then by
independence the likelihood function for the model is simply
Q
i
Q
a  
ni,a
i .
13 While in principle one
can attempt to estimate   and ✓ via direct maximum likelihood or the EM algorithm, in practice
the model is intractable due to the large number of parameters that need to be estimated (and
which grow linearly in the number of observations). LDA overcomes this challenge by adopting a
Bayesian approach, and placing Dirichlet priors on the   and ✓i terms. For estimating posteriors
we follow the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach of Gri ths and Steyvers (2004).14
Here we discuss the estimated object of interest, which are the two estimated pure behaviors b 0
and b 1, as well as the estimated behavioral indices b✓i for every CEO i = 1, . . . , N .
Intuitively, LDA identifies pure behaviors by finding patterns of co-occurrence among activities
13While a behavior defines a distribution over activities with correlations among individual features (planning,
duration, etc.), each separate activity in a CEO’s diary is drawn independently given pure behaviors and ✓i. The
independence assumption of time blocks within a CEO is appropriate for our purpose to understand overall patterns
of CEO behavior rather than issues such as the evolution of behavior over time, or other more complex dependencies.
These are of course interesting, but outside the scope of the paper.
14We set a uniform prior on ✓i–i.e. a symmetric Dirichlet with hyperparameter 1–and a symmetric Dirichlet with
hyperparameter 0.1 on  k. This choice of hyperparameter promotes sparsity in the pure behaviors. Source code for
implementation is available from https://github.com/sekhansen.
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across CEOs, so infrequently occurring activities are not informative. For this reason we drop activ-
ities in fewer than 30 CEOs’ diaries, which leaves 654 unique activities and 98,347 time blocks—or
78% of interactive time—in our baseline empirical exercise. In the appendix we alternatively drop
activities in fewer than 15 and 45 CEOs’ diaries and find little e↵ect in the main results.
2.4.2 Estimates
To illustrate di↵erences in estimated pure behaviors, in Figure 4 we order the elements of X
according to their estimated probability in b 0 and then plot the estimated probabilities of each
element of X in both behaviors. The figure shows that the combinations that are most likely in
pure behavior 0 have low probability in pure behavior 1 and vice versa. Tables B.1 and B.2 list the
five most common activities in each of the two behaviors.15 To construct a formal test of whether
the observed di↵erences between pure behaviors are consistent with a model in which there is only
one pure behavior (i.e. a model with no systematic heterogeneity), we simulate data by drawing an
activity for each time block in the data from a probability vector that matches the raw empirical
frequency of activities. We then use this simulated data to estimate the LDA model with two pure
behaviors as in our baseline analysis, and find systematically less di↵erence between pure behaviors
than in our actual data (for further discussion see the Appendix).
The two pure behaviors we estimate represent extremes. As discussed above, individual CEOs
generate activities according to the behavioral index ✓i that gives the probability that any specific
activity is drawn from pure behavior 1. Figure 5 plots both the frequency and cumulative distribu-
tions of the b✓i estimates across CEOs. Many CEOs are estimated to be mainly associated with one
pure behavior: 316 have a behavioral index less than 0.05 and 94 have an index greater than 0.95.
As Figure 5 shows, though, the bulk of CEOs lies away from these extremes, where the distribution
of the index is essentially uniform.
2.4.3 Interpretation of the CEO Behavior Index
We now turn to analyzing the underlying heterogeneity between pure behaviors that generate
di↵erences among CEOs, which is ultimately the main interest of the LDA model. To do so, we
compute marginal distributions over each relevant category from both pure behaviors. Figure 6
displays the ratios of these marginal distributions (pure behavior 1 over pure behavior 0). A value
of 1 indicates that each pure behavior generates the category with the same probability; a value of
0.5 indicates that pure behavior 1 is half as likely to generate the category; and so on.
Several striking di↵erences emerge across pure behaviors. Pure behavior 1 is substantially more
likely to engage in communications (phone calls, video conferences, etc), spend time with C-suite
15Table B.3 displays the estimated average time that CEOs spend with the di↵erent categories in figure 1 derived
from the estimated pure behaviors and CEO behavioral indices. Reassuringly, there is a tight relationship between
the shares in the raw data and the estimated shares.
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Figure 4: Probabilities of Activities in Estimated Pure Behaviors
Notes: The dotted line plots the estimated probabilities of di↵erent activities in pure behavior 0, the solid line plots
the estimated probabilities of di↵erent activities in pure behavior 1. The 654 di↵erent activities are ordered left to
right in descending order of their estimated probability in pure behavior 0.
Figure 5: CEO Behavior and Index Distribution
behavior 0 is twice as likely to spend time with only outside functions. Very stark
di↵erences emerge in time spent with specific inside functions. Behavior 1 is over ten times
as likely to spend time in activities with commercial-group and business-unit functions,
and nearly four times as likely to spend time with the human-resource function. On the
other hand, behavior 0 is over twice as likely to engage in activities with production.
Smaller di↵erences exist for finance (50% more likely in behavior 0) and marketing (10%
more likely in behavior 1) functions. In terms of outside functions, behavior 0 is over
three times as likely to spend time with suppliers and 25% more likely to spend time with
clients, while behavior 1 is almost eight times more likely to attend trade associations.
In summary, an overall pattern arises in which behavior 0 engages in short, small,
production-oriented activities and behavior 1 engages in long, planned activities that
combine numerous functions, especially high-level insiders.
2.4.2 The CEO Behavior Index
The two behaviors we estimate represent extremes. As discussed above, individual CEOs
generate time use according to the behavioral index  i that gives the probability that any
specific time block’s feature combination is drawn from behavior 1. Figure 4 plots both
the frequency and cumulative distributions of  i in our sample.
(a) Frequency Distribution (b) Cumulative Distribution
Figure 4: CEO Behavior Index Distributions
Notes: The left-hand side plot displays the number of CEOs with behavioral indices
in each of 50 bins that divide the space [0, 1] evenly. The right-hand side plot
displays the cumulative percentage of CEOs with behavioral indices lying in these
bins.
Many CEOs are estimated to be mainly associated with one behavior: 316 have a be-
havioral index less than 0.05 and 94 have an index greater than 0.95. As figure 4 shows,
17
Notes: The left-hand side plot displays the number of CEOs with behavioral indices in each of 50 bins that divide
the space [0,1] evenly. The right-hand side plot displays the cumulative percentage of CEOs with behavioral indices
lying in these bins.
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Figure 6: MarginalsPanel&A Panel&B
Panel&C Panel&D
Plant&visits&
Notes: We generate these figures in two steps. First, we create marginal distributions for each behavior for each
feature in activities. Then, for each category analyzed in figure 1, we report the probability of the category in
behavior 1 over the probability in behavior 0. Panel D represents four separate marginal distributions. Each has two
categories, so we report the ratio for only one.
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executives, bring together inside and outside functions, and bring together more than one function
of any kind. Pure behavior 0 is more likely to devote time to plant visits, interactions with employees
responsible for production, interactions with outsiders in general, and interactions with clients and
suppliers in particular. Less marked di↵erences arise for other categories. We have constructed
simulated standard errors for the di↵erences in probabilities of each feature reported in the figure,
based on draws from the Markov chains used to estimate the reported means. All di↵erences are
highly significant except time spent with insiders. In sum, di↵erences in the CEO behavior index
mirror di↵erences in the way CEOs coordinate the input of others: low-index CEOs deal with one
individual at a time, who is more likely to be of the production division; high-index CEOs bring
several individuals together, mostly at the top of the hierarchy.
CEOs do not seem to prefer either type of behavior. We find no correlation between the behavior
index and the CEOs’ job satisfaction (on a scale from 1 to 5): the average value of the CEO index
for those above (below) the median level of job satisfaction is 0.42 (0.44), the p-value of the test of
zero di↵erence is 0.32.
The question of interest is whether CEO behavior is associated with di↵erences in firm per-
formance. A priori, there is no reason to expect either behavior to be more or less beneficial to
all firms. Indeed, it is easy to imagine how di↵erent behaviors can be optimal under di↵erent
circumstances. For instance, the coordinative role of CEOs may be more relevant in more complex
organizations, either in terms of size of the organization or nature of activities undertaken, relative
to a purely operational focus. We illustrate this point in Figure E.2 in the Appendix, in which we
show that the CEO behavior index is correlated with various metrics proxying for firm size (number
of employees, multinational and listed status) and organizational structure (e.g. whether the firm
also employees a COO), as well as di↵erent CEO characteristics (work experience abroad, skills).
These correlations illustrate a simple but crucial point: the allocation of CEOs with di↵erent be-
haviors across firms is correlated with firm characteristics, i.e. firms select CEOs on the basis of
their own needs and observable CEO characteristics.
In the next section we present a simple theoretical framework to explicitly model the assignment
of CEOs to firms, and to illustrate how this a↵ects the interpretation of the association between
CEO behavior and firm performance using cross-sectional data.
3 Modeling the Assignment of CEOs to Firms
This section develops a simple assignment model to interpret the cross-sectional correlation between
CEO behavior and firm performance. The model allows for both directions of causality: firm
performance can a↵ect CEO behavior and CEO behavior can a↵ect firm performance. The outcome
of the model is the null hypothesis of zero correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance,
which we test. The model specifies the conditions under which this correlation is di↵erent from
zero, and how a non-zero correlation may reflect the importance of firm level unobservables factors,
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and/or mismatches in the assignment of CEOs to firms.
3.1 Set-up
Consider for simplicity a case with two possible behaviors that CEO i can adopt: xi = 0 and xi = 1.
Once a CEO is hired, he decides how he is going to manage the firm that hired him. CEO i has a
type ⌧i 2 {0, 1}. Type 0 prefers behavior 0 to behavior 1. Namely, he incurs a cost of 0 if he selects
behavior 0 and cost of c > 0 if he selects behavior 1. Type 1 is the converse: he incurs a cost of 0 if
he selects behavior 1 and cost of c if he selects behavior 0. The cost of choosing a certain behavior
can be interpreted as coming from the preferences of the CEO (i.e. he may find one behavior more
enjoyable than the other), or his skill set (i.e. he may find one behavior less costly to implement
than the other).
Firms also have types. The type of firm f is ⌧f 2 {0, 1}. The output of firm f assigned to CEO
i is
yfi =  f +
 
I⌧f=xi
 
  (1)
where I is the indicator function and   > 0. Hence, firm f ’s productivity depends on two compo-
nents. The first is a firm-specific component that we denote  f . In principle, this can depend on
observable firm characteristics, unobservable firm characteristics, and the firm’s type. The second
component is specific to the behavior of the CEO. Namely, if the CEO’s behavior matches the firm’s
type, then productivity increases by a positive amount  . This captures the fact that di↵erent
firms require di↵erent behaviors: there is not necessarily a “best” behavior in all circumstances. We
assume that c <   so that it is e cient for the CEO to always adopt a behavior that corresponds
to the firm’s type.
Equation (1) makes precise that the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance
can arise for two reasons: (1) Di↵erent firms have di↵erent baseline productivities and this a↵ects
what kind of CEO they look for; (2) If there are frictions in the CEO market, firms may not get
the CEO they are looking for, which leads to productivity losses.
To introduce the possibility of frictions, we must discuss governance. Firms o↵er a linear
compensation scheme that rewards CEOs for generating good performance. The wage that CEO i
receives from employment in firm f is
w (yfi) = w¯ +B(yfi    f ) = w +BI⌧f=xi ,
where w¯ is a fixed part, and B   0 is a parameter that can be interpreted directly as the
performance-related part of CEO compensation, or indirectly as how likely it is that a CEO is
retained as a function of his performance (in this interpretation the CEO receives a fixed per-
period wage but he is more likely to be terminated early if firm performance is low).
The total utility of the CEO is equal to compensation less behavior cost, i.e. w(yfi)  I⌧i 6=xic.
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After a CEO is hired, he chooses his behavior. If the CEO is hired by a firm with the same type,
he will obviously choose the behavior that is preferred by both parties. The interesting case is
when the CEO type and the firm type di↵er. If B > c  , the CEO will adapt to the firm’s desired
behavior, produce an output of  f + , and receive a total payo↵ of w¯+B   c. If instead B < c  ,
the CEO will choose xi = ⌧i, produce output  f and receive a payo↵ w¯. We think of B as a measure
of governance. A higher B aligns CEO behavior with the firm’s interests.
3.2 Pairing Firms and CEOs
Now that we know what happens once a CEO begins working for a firm, let us turn our attention
to the assignment process. There is a mass 1 of firms. A proportion   of them are of type 1,
the remainder are of type 0. The pool of potential CEOs is larger than the pool of firms seeking
a CEO. There is a mass m >> 1 of potential CEOs. Without loss of generality, assume that a
proportion      of CEOs are of type 1. The remainder are of type 0. From now on, we refer
to type 1 as the scarce CEO type and type 0 as the abundant CEO type. We emphasize that
scarcity is relative to the share of firm types. So, it may be the case that the share of type-1 CEOs
is actually more numerous than the share of type-0 firms. The model also nests the case of pure
vertical di↵erentiation, where no firm actually wants a type-0 CEO. This happens when   = 1.
The market for CEOs works as follows. In the beginning, every prospective CEO sends his
application to a centralized CEO job market. The applicant indicates whether he wishes to work
for a type-0 or type-1 firm. All the applications are in a large pool. Each firm begins by downloading
an application meant for its type. Each download costs k to the firm. After receiving an application,
firms receive a signal about the underlying type of the CEO that submitted it. If the type of the
applicant corresponds to the type of the firm, the signal has value 1. If the type is di↵erent, the
signal is equal to zero with probability ⇢ 2 [0, 1] and to one with probability 1   ⇢. Thus, ⇢ = 1
denotes perfect screening and ⇢ = 0 represents no screening.16 This last assumption distinguishes
our approach from existing theories of manager-firm assignment, where the matching process is
assumed to be frictionless, and the resulting allocation of managerial talent achieves productive
e ciency (Gabaix and Landier (2008), Tervio (2008), Bandiera et al. (2015)). One exception in
the literature is Chade and Eeckhout (2016), who present a model in which agents’ characteristics
are only realized after a match is formed, which leads to a positive probability of mismatch in
equilibrium.
Potential CEOs maximize their expected payo↵, which is equal to the probability they are hired
times the payo↵ if they are hired. Firms maximize their profit less the screening cost (given by the
number of downloaded application multiplied by k). Clearly, if k is low enough, firms download
16The implicit assumption is that CEOs have private information about their types, while firms’ types are common
knowledge. However, we could also allow firms to have privately observed types; in equilibrium, they will report them
truthfully. Moreover, if CEOs have limited or no knowledge of their own type, it is easy to see that our mismatch
result would hold a fortiori.
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applications until they receive one whose associated signal indicates the CEO type matches the
firm type, which we assume holds in equilibrium.
The following proposition makes precise the conditions under which there is no correlation
between CEO behavior and firm performance. Define residual productivity as total productivity
minus type-specific baseline productivity: yfi    f .
Proposition 1 Firms led by CEOs who choose behavior 1 and those led by CEOs who choose
behavior 0 have equal residual productivity if at least one of the following conditions is met: (i)
Neither CEO type is su ciently scarce; or (ii) Screening is su ciently e↵ective; or (iii) Governance
is su ciently good.
Each of the three conditions guarantees e cient assignment. If there is no scarce CEO type
(  =  ), a CEO has no reason to apply to a firm of a di↵erent type. If screening is perfect (⇢ = 1),
a CEO who applies to a firm of the other type is always caught (and hence he won’t do it). If
governance is good (B < c  ,), a CEO who is hired by a firm of the other type will always behave
in the firm’s ideal way (and hence there will either be no detectable e↵ect on firm performance or
CEOs will only apply to firms of their type).
In contrast, if any of conditions (i)-(iii) are not met, CEO behavior and firm performance will
be correlated, either because of unobservable firm traits or because of ine cient assignments. The
following proposition characterizes how the latter can occur in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If the screening process is su ciently unreliable, governance is su ciently poor,
and one CEO type is su ciently abundant,17 then in equilibrium:
• All scarce-type CEOs are correctly assigned;
• Some abundant-type CEOs are misassigned;
• The average residual productivity of firms run by abundant-type CEOs is lower than those of
firms run by scarce-type CEOs.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If all abundant-type CEOs applied to their firm type,
they would have a low probability of being hired and they would prefer to apply to the other firm
type and try to pass as a scarce-type CEO. In order for this to be true, it must be that the share
of abundant types is su ciently larger than the share of scarce types, and that the risk that they
are screened out is not too large. If this is the case, then in equilibrium some abundant-type CEOs
will apply to the wrong firm type up to the point where the chance of getting a job is equalized
17Formally, this is given by the conditions: B < c  , and ⇢ <
   
     .
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under the two strategies. In the extreme case where   = 1, that is when no firm demands type-0
CEOs, abundant-type CEOs reduce productivity in all firms.
Under Proposition 2, the economy under consideration does not achieve productive e ciency.
As the overall pool of scarce-type CEOs is assumed to be su cient to cover all firms that prefer
that CEO type (m >> 1), it would be possible to give all firms their preferred type and thus
increase overall production.18
4 CEO Behavior and Firm Performance: Evidence
4.1 From Theory to Data
As described in Equation (1), the output of firm f assigned to CEO i depends on firm type and
CEO behavior. We observe CEOs’ behavior and firm performance but not firm type. Then the
observed di↵erence in performance between firms that hire a type 1 CEO and those that hire a
type 0 CEO is:
y.1   y.0 = s1( 1 + ) + (1  s1) 0   [s0( 0 + ) + (1  s0) 1]
where si is the share of CEOs who are correctly assigned, thus, for instance, the average performance
of firms led by type-1 CEOs is equal to the performance of type-1 firms ( 1 + ) weighted by the
share of type-1 CEOs who are correctly assigned (s1) plus the performance of misassigned firms 0
( 0) weighted by the share of type-1 CEOs who are wrongly assigned (1  s1). Simplifying yields:
y.1   y.0 = (s1 + s0   1)( 1    0) + (s1   s0)4 (2)
Equation (2) makes precise that the cross-sectional correlation captures both di↵erences in firms’
”innate” productivity levels ( 1  0) and the extent of the misassignment times its costs (s1 s0)4.
Note that a priori ( 1    0) can be positive or negative. Furthermore, if there are no frictions
and the CEOs are all correctly assigned, then s1 = s0 = 1 and the di↵erence in means only captures
average productivity di↵erences between firms that hire a CEO 1 and those that hire a CEO 0.
Conversely, (s1   s0) > 0 if and only if type-1 CEOs are more likely to be correctly assigned—that
is, if they are more scarce—than types 0, otherwise it is negative.19
4.2 Cross-Sectional Correlations
To estimate the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance, we combine our CEO
behavior data with accounting information extracted from the ORBIS database. We were able to
18If side transfers were feasible, this would also be a Pareto improvement as a type-1 CEO assigned to type-0 firm
generates a higher bilateral surplus than a type-0 CEO matched with a type-1 firm, and the new firm-CEO pair could
therefore compensate the now unemployed type-0 CEO for her job loss.
19Recall that in the equilibrium of proposition 2 we have s1 = 1 and 0  s0 < 1.
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gather at least one year of sales and employment data in the period in which the CEOs were in
o ce for 920 of the 1,114 firm in the CEO sample.20
We start by analyzing whether CEO behavior correlates with productivity, a key metric of firm
performance (Syverson, 2011). We follow a simple production function approach and estimate by
OLS a regression of the form:
yifts = ↵b✓i +  Eeft +  Kkft +  Mmft + ⇣t + ⌘s + "ifts (3)
where yifts is the log sales (in constant 2010 USD) of firm f, led by CEO i, in period t and sector
s. To smooth out short run fluctuations and reduce measurement error in performance, yifts is
average sales computed over up to the three most recent years pre-dating the survey, conditional
on the CEO being in o ce, but the results are very similar when we use yearly data and cluster
the standard errors by firm (Appendix Table E.2, column 2).21 b✓i is the estimated behavior index
of CEO i, eft, kft, and mft denote, respectively, the natural logarithm of the number of firm
employees and, when available, capital and materials. ⇣t and ⌘s are period and three digits SIC
sector fixed e↵ects, respectively.22 We include country and year dummies throughout, as well as a
set of interview noise controls listed in the notes to Table 1.
Basic productivity results Column 1, Table 1 shows the estimates of equation (3) just control-
ling for firm size, country, year and industry fixed e↵ects, and noise controls. Since most countries
in our sample report at least sales and number of employees, we can include in this labor produc-
tivity regression a sample of 920 firms. The estimate of ↵ is positive and we can reject the null of
zero correlation between firm labor productivity and the CEO behavior index at the 1% level.23
Column 2 adds capital, which is available for a smaller sample of firms (618). The coe cient of
the CEO behavior index remains of similar magnitude and is still significant at the 5% level in
the subsample. The magnitude of the CEO behavior index is about 10% of the e↵ect of a one
standard deviation increase in capital.24 In Column 3 we add materials, which further restricts the
sample to 448 firms. In this even smaller sample, the e↵ect of standard inputs has the expected
20Of these: 29 did not report sales information at all; 128 were dropped due to extreme values in the productivity
data, 37 had data that referred only to years in which the CEO was not in o ce or in o ce for less than one year.
See the data Appendix for more details.
21In practice we have 3 years for 58% of the sample, 2 years for 24% and 1 year for the rest.
22Since the data is averaged over three years, year dummies are set as the rounded average year for which the
performance data is available.
23Since the index summarizes information on a large set of activity features, a question of interest is whether this
correlation is driven just by a subset of those. To this purpose, in Table E.1 we show the results of equation (3)
controlling for the individual features used to compute the index separately. The table show that each feature is
correlated with performance on its own, so that the index captures their combined e↵ect. In addition, we obtain the
same results when using more standard dimensionality reduction techniques such as k-means and principal components
(see Table E.2).
24To make this comparison we multiply the coe cient of the CEO behavior index in column 2 (0.227) by the
standard deviation of the index in the subsample (0.227*0.33) = 0.07, and express it relative to the same figures for
capital (coe cient of 0.387 times the standard deviation of log capital of 1.88=0.73).
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Table 1: CEO behavior and Firm Performance
Table 3: CEO behavior and Firm Performance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Profits/Emp
CEO behavior index 0.343*** 0.227** 0.322*** 0.641** 0.505** 9.987**
(0.108) (0.111) (0.121) (0.279) (0.235) (3.994)
log(employment) 0.889*** 0.555*** 0.346*** 0.339** 0.804*** 0.067
(0.040) (0.066) (0.099) (0.152) (0.075) (0.052)
log(capital) 0.387*** 0.188*** 0.194*
(0.042) (0.056) (0.098)
log(materials) 0.447*** 0.421***
(0.073) (0.109)
Management 0.187**
(0.074)
Number of observations (firms) 920 618 448 243 156 386
Observations used to compute means 2,202 1,519 1,054 604 383 1,028
Sample
all with k with k & m with k & 
m, listed
with 
management 
score
with 
profits, 
listed
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. We include at most 5 years of data for each firm
and build a simple average across output and all inputs over this period. The number of observations used to compute these
means are reported at the foot of the table. The sample in Columns 1 includes all firms with at least one year with both sales and
employment data. Columns 2, 3 and 4 restrict the sample to firms with additional data on capital (column 2), capital and materials
(columns 3 and 4). The sample in columns 4 and 7 is restricted to listed firms. "Firm size" is the log of total employment in the
firm. All columns include a full set of country and year dummies, two digits SIC industry dummies and noise controls. Noise
controls are a full set of dummies to denote the week in the year in which the data was collected, a reliability score assigned by
the interviewer at the end of the survey week, a dummy taking value one if the data was collected through the PA of the CEO,
rather than the CEO himself, and interviewer dummies. All columns weighted by the week representativeness score assigned by
the CEO at the end of the interview week. Errors clustered at the 2 digit SIC level.
Log(sales)
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. We include at most 3 years of data for each
fir a d build a simple average across output and all i puts over this period. The number of observ tions used to compute
these means are reported at the foot of the table. The sample in Columns 1 includes all firms with at least one year with both
sales and employment data. Columns 2, 3 and 4 restrict the sample to firms with additional data on capital (column 2), capital
and materi ls (columns 3 and 4). The sample in column 4 is rest icted to list d firms. ”Firm size” is the log of total employment
in the firm. All columns include a full set of country and year dummies, three digits SIC industry dummies and noise controls.
Noise controls are a full set of dummies to denote the week in the year in which the data was collected, a reliability score
assigned by the interviewer at the end of the survey week, a dummy taking value one if the data was collected through the
PA of the CEO, rather than the CEO himself, and interviewer dummies. All columns weighted by the week representativeness
score assigned by the CEO at the end of the interview week. Errors clustered at the three digit SIC level.
magnitude and is precisely estimated, but the magnitude and the precision of coe cient of the
CEO behavior index remains unchanged. Column 4 restricts the sample to firms that, in addition
to having data on capital and materials, are listed on stock market and hence have higher quality
data (243 firms). The coe cient of the CEO behavior index is larger in magnitude (0.641) and
significant at the 1% level (standard error 0.279). In results reported in Table E.2 we show that
the coe cient on the CEO behavior index is of similar magnitude and significance when we use the
Olley-Pakes estimator of productivity.
Management What CEOs do with their time may reflect broader di↵erences in management
processes across firms rather than CEO behavior per se. To investigate this issue, we matched the
CEO behavior index with management practices collected using the World Management Survey
(Bloom et al. 2016).25 We were able to gather management data for 191 firms in our CEO sample.
The CEO behavior index is indeed positively correlated with the average management score: a
25The survey methodology is based on semi-structured double blind interviews with plant level managers, run
independently from the CEO time use survey.
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one standard deviation change in the management index is associated with a 0.06 increase in the
CEO behavior index.26 For the 156 firms for which we could match the management and CEO
behavior data with accounting information, we find both variables to be independently correlated
with productivity. The coe cients reported in Column (5) imply that a standard deviation change
in the CEO behavior (management) index is associated with an increase of 0.16 (0.19) log points
in sales.27 We also find a similar pattern when controlling for other potentially confounding firm
and CEO characteristics, and for CEO total hours worked; Table E.2 shows that including other
firm or CEO observables hardly changes the magnitude of the CEO behavior index.
Profits Column 6 analyzes the correlation between CEO behavior and profits per employee. This
allows us to assess whether CEOs capture all the extra rent they generate, or whether firms profit
from being run by high-index CEOs. The results are consistent with the latter: the correlation be-
tween the CEO index and profits per employee is positive and precisely estimated. The magnitudes
are also large: a one standard deviation increase in the CEO behavior index is associated with an
increase of approximatively $3,010 in profits per employee. Another way to look at this issue is
to compare the magnitude of the relationship between the CEO behavior index and profits to the
magnitude of the relationship between the CEO behavior index and CEO pay. We are able to make
this comparison for a subsample of 196 firms with publicly available compensation data. Over this
subsample, we find that a standard deviation change in the CEO behavior index is associated with
an increase in profits per employee of $4,939 (which using the median number of employees in the
subsample would correspond to $2,978,000 increase in total profit) and an increase in annual CEO
compensation of $47,081. According to the point estimates above, the CEO keeps less than 2%
of the marginal value he creates through his behavior. This broadly confirms the finding that the
increase in firm performance associated with higher values of the CEO behavior index is not fully
appropriated by the CEO in the form of rents.
More than two pure CEO behaviors Working with only two pure behaviors has the clear
advantage of delivering a one-dimensional index, which is easy to represent and interpret. In
contrast, when the approach is extended to K rather than two pure behaviors, the behavioral
index becomes a point on a (K   1)-dimensional simplex. However, a natural question to ask is
whether the simplicity of the two-behaviors approach may lead to significant loss of information,
26See Appendix Table E.3 for details. To our knowledge, this is the first time that data on middle level management
practices and information on CEO behavior is systematically analyzed. Bender et al. (2016) analyze the correlation
between management practices and employees’ wage fixed e↵ects and find evidence of sorting of employees with
higher fixed e↵ects in better managed firms. The analysis also includes a subsample of top managers, but due to data
confidentiality it excludes the highest paid individuals, who are likely to be CEOs. The correlation between CEO
behavior and management practices is driven primarily by practices related to operational practices, rather than HR
and people-related management practices.
27When we do not control for the management (CEO) index, the coe cient on the CEO (management) index is
0.606 (0.207) significant at the 5% level. The magnitude of the coe cient on the management index is similar to the
one reported by Bloom et al. (2016) in the full management sample (0.15).
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especially when it comes to the correlation between CEO behavior and performance. To investigate
this issue, we followed an alternative approach in which the optimal number of pure behaviors is
chosen according to a statistical criterion. To implement this approach, we estimate LDA on
randomly drawn training subsets of the data, and then use the estimated parameters to predict the
held-out data.
This approach shows that a model with eleven pure behaviors is best at prediction. However,
as we discuss in the Appendix, the pure behavior with the largest correlation with productivity
is actually among the most dissimilar to pure behavior 0 used in the simple K = 2 model. We
conclude from this exercise that—in spite of its simplicity—the model with two pure behaviors is
actually able to capture many of the salient performance-related distinctions in CEO behavior.28
4.3 Why is CEO Behavior Correlated with Firm Performance?
The model makes it clear that the the results in Table 1—i.e. a non-zero correlation between
CEO behavior and firm performance—can be due to: (1) unobservable firm traits that determine
both the need for a high-index CEO and firm performance; (2) ine cient assignment of CEOs to
firms, so that some of the firms requiring high-index CEOs end up—due to an imperfect allocation
mechanism—with low-index CEOs. In other words, the correlation might be capturing both the
e↵ect of firm performance on CEO behavior or the e↵ect of CEO behavior on firm performance.
Due to the cross sectional nature of the CEO behavior data, we cannot separately identify
these two channels, but we can provide some evidence on their relative importance exploiting both
within- and cross-sectional firm heterogeneity.
4.3.1 Firm Performance Before and After the CEO Appointment
To provide evidence on the relevance of time-invariant and unobservable firm-specific factors in
driving the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance, we exploit the fact that, for a
subset of CEOs in our sample who have been recently appointed, we can observe firm performance
before and after the CEO appointment. Therefore, while our survey measures CEO behavior just at
one point in time and within a single firm, we can use this pseudo-panel to test whether firms that
eventually appoint a high-index CEO have di↵erent productivity levels or trends relative to firms
that eventually appoint a low-index CEO. This analysis is informative of the practical relevance of
firms’ unobservable traits, because it allows us to measure whether the appointment of a high-index
CEO improves productivity within the same firm controlling for time invariant firm unobservables,
and whether the appointment of a high-index CEO is preceded, and thus possibly driven, by a
period of high growth.
28The tradeo↵ between interpretability (which favors a small number of pure behaviors) and goodness-of-fit (which
favors a greater number) is well known in the unsupervised learning literature. See, for example, Chang et al. (2009).
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To implement this approach, we restrict the sample to the 204 firms that have accounting data
within a five-year interval both before and after CEO appointment. To start, Column 1 shows that
these firms are representative of the larger sample in terms of the correlation between the CEO
behavior index and performance. The correlation is 0.362 (standard error 0.132) for firms that do
not belong to the subsample, and the interaction between the CEO behavior index and the dummy
denoting the subsample equals -0.095 and is not precisely estimated. Next, since we have data on
multiple years before appointment we can test whether the parallel trend assumption, namely that
firms have similar productivity trends before appointment regardless of the magnitude of the CEO
behavior index. Column 2 shows that this is indeed the case.
Finally, we look at the within-firm changes in productivity according to the levels of the CEO
behavior index, by estimating the following di↵erence-in-di↵erences model:
yft = ↵At +  Atb✓i +  Eeft + ⇣t + ⌘f + "it (4)
Where t = 0 the year the CEO is appointed, and t 2 [ 5,+5]. ⌘f are firm fixed e↵ects, At = 1
after appointment, and b✓i is the behavior index of the appointed CEO. The coe cient of interest
is  , which measures whether firms that eventually appoint CEO with higher levels of the CEO
behavior index experience a greater increase in productivity after the CEO is in o ce relative to
the years preceding the appointment. Note that, since we do not know the behavior of the previous
CEO, this is a lower bound on the e↵ect of switching from low to high behavior index CEOs, since at
least part of these firms would have had already a high-index CEO before the current appointment.
Column 3 shows that the coe cient   is positive and significant (coe cient 0.130, standard error
0.057). Given this coe cient, the within firm change in productivity after the CEO appointment
is -0.05, 0 and 0.07 log points for values of the CEO index that are, respectively, at the 10th, 50th
and 90th percentiles of the distribution of the CEO behavior index.29. Column 4 splits the post
period into two sub periods: 1-2 and 3-5 years after appointment. The results suggest that the
correlation materializes three years after appointment.
Taken together, the results in Table 2 rule out that the correlation is solely driven by di↵erences
in time-invariant firm level unobservables and di↵erences in pre-appointment trends. Had this been
the case, we would have detected a di↵erence between firms that eventually appoint a behavior 0
CEO and those that appoint a behavior 1 CEO also before their appointments. Furthermore, the
delay in the productivity increase is compatible with the idea that the actions of the new CEO may
take time to a↵ect the production process—in Appendix D we show a simple dynamic extension of
the model developed in Section 3 which is compatible with these dynamic patterns.30 An alternative
29The overall e↵ect turns positive for values of the CEO behavior index greater than 0.42, which corresponds to
the 62nd percentile of the distribution of the index.
30The existence of significant organizational inertia within firms has been a central theme in the management
literature (Cyert (1963)), and is central to a recent strand of the organizational economics literature. For example, in
the model of Halac and Prat (2016), it takes time for a corporate leader to change the existing management practice
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explanation is that CEOs with longer tenure have had more time to learn the needs of the firm, and
that this experience may generate the correlation between CEO behavior and performance. To shed
light on this, Column 5 restricts the sample to the 102 firms whose current CEO had been in o ce
for less than three years when we interviewed the CEO, and for which we have firm performance
data three years after the appointment.31 The fact that the results hold, and are actually stronger
in this smaller sample of less experienced CEOs points to the fact that the earlier correlation was
not due to learning e↵ects.
It is important to note that, while the findings attenuate concerns related to time-invariant
correlated unobservables, the data at hand does not allow us to rule out other time-varying unob-
servables. For example, firms may appoint CEOs of a certain type in anticipation of events that
will take place three years after the appointment date (e.g. the CEO appointment may coincide
with a change in firm strategy which may take time to materialize). However, it is worthwhile
noting that this would require extraordinary board capabilities. First, the board hiring strategy
must be such that they dismiss CEOs who are currently performing adequately, because they might
perform poorly four years ahead, which requires exceptional abilities in both forecasting the firm’s
needs and removing CEOs. Second, this strategy implies that boards are willing to bear losses due
to the wrong assignment, or CEOs are willing to behave sub-optimally for three years (33% of the
average CEO tenure in our sample), rather than appoint a new CEO when he is actually needed.
Furthermore, this explanation is hard to square with the cross-country and cross-regional evidence
in the relationship between CEO behavior and productivity, which we discuss in the next section.
4.3.2 Variation along the Development Path
As discussed in Proposition 2, the other reason to observe a cross-sectional correlation between
CEO behavior and firm performance is the presence of CEO-firm assignment frictions. If at all
relevant, we expect such frictions to be more severe in less developed regions due to both di↵erences
in the supply of managerial capital,32 and in the quality of corporate governance, which a↵ect both
the selection and the dismissal of misassigned CEOs.33
Consistent with this idea, Figure 7 plots productivity residuals (estimated as in Column 1, Table
1) by country income levels (Brazil and India for low/middle-income countries vs. France, Germany,
and to a↵ect the company’s culture. Empirically, Bloom et al. (2016) estimate adjustment costs in managerial capital
of similar magnitude to the ones estimated for physical capital.
31We do not know whether the CEOs we interview are still in o ce after year 3. To the extent that some of them
are not, the estimates are biased downwards.
32Gennaioli et al. (2013) report wide di↵erences in the supply of managerial/entrepreneurial human capital using
regional data for a large cross section of countries, and show the presence of a large and significant association with
regional income per capita and firm-level productivity. Di↵erences in the availability of basic managerial skills across
countries and their relationship with development and firm performance are also discussed in Bloom et al. (2016).
33Porta et al. (1999) and La Porta et al. (2000) study the heterogeneity of corporate governance and ownership
structures around the world. More recently, and specifically related to CEOs, Urban (2016) reports large di↵erences
in the percentage of CEOs dismissed for bad performance in public firms in Brazil and India (both 16%) vs. France
(29%), Germany (40%), UK (35%) and US (27%).
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Figure 7: Productivity Residuals Densities by Development Level
Notes: This figure plots the estimated kernel densities of the productivity residuals b"if (demeaned at the country
level) by regional income and by observed CEO behavior. These are generated by the regression in Column 1 in
Table 1 but without country fixed e↵ects and the CEO behavior index. The low/middle-income countries are Brazil
and India, while the high-income countries are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
UK and US for high-income countries) and CEO behavior, where for simplicity we classify CEOs
as behavior 1 if their CEO behavior index is   0.50, and 0 otherwise. The figure shows a marked
di↵erence between the two sets of countries. The di↵erence in means between the distributions in
Panel A (0.32) is eight times larger than the di↵erence in Panel B (0.04). This is consistent with
the idea that observed CEO behavior in high-income countries is much more likely to correspond to
firms’ needs than in low/middle-income countries, i.e. that assignment frictions are substantially
lower.
To provide further evidence on this point, we examine whether the coe cient on the CEO
behavior index in Equation (3) varies according to the level of development in the country, or
in the region within a country. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. We start by
simply reporting the baseline results shown in Column 1 in Table 1. In Column 2 we interact the
continuous CEO behavior index with an indicator that equals 1 if the firm is located in a high-
income country (France, Germany, UK and US). The coe cient on the CEO behavior index for
low/middle-income countries is 0.631 and precisely estimated (standard error 0.167) in these areas,
whereas it is much lower (0.631-0.619=0.012) and we cannot reject the null that it equals zero in
high-income countries. This pattern also holds when we use variation in GDP per capita across
regions within the same country, exploiting di↵erences in development across 113 distinct regions
in our sample. This is shown in Column 3, where we interact the CEO behavior index interacted
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Table 3: Heterogeneity across Countries and RegionsTabel 5: Heterogeneity across countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
log(employment) 0.889*** 0.888*** 0.889*** 0.879***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041)
CEO Behavior Index 0.343*** 0.631*** 2.996*** 3.366***
(0.108) (0.167) (0.811) (1.021)
Dummy high income country 0.375
(0.495)
High income country*CEO behavior index -0.619***
(0.204)
log(regional GDP) 0.114
(0.103)
log(regional GDP)*CEO Behavior index -0.278*** -0.316***
(0.083) (0.105)
Number of observations (firms) 920 920 919 919
Region fixed effects No No No Yes
Cluster Sic 2 Sic 2 Region Region
Log(sales)
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All columns include the same
controls used in Table 3, column 1. "High income country" is a dummy taking value 1 for firms located in France,
Germany, UK or US. "Log regional income per capita" is in current purchasing-power-parity (PPP) dollars and is
drawn from Gennaioli et al (2013). Errors clustered as noted. All columns weighted by the week representativeness
score assigned by the CEO at the end of the interview week.
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All columns include the same
controls used in Table 1, column 1. ”High income country” is a dummy taking value 1 for firms located in France,
Germany, UK or US. ”Log regional income per capita” is in current purchasing-power-parity (PPP) dollars and is
drawn from Gennaioli et al (2013). Errors clustered as noted. All columns weighted by the week representativeness
score assigned by the CEO at the end of the interview week. Column (4) includes regional dummies.
with the log of regional GDP level drawn from Gennaioli et al. (2013). The results show that the
coe cient on the CEO behavior index declines as the level of regional GDP per capital increases; its
magnitude implies that we cannot reject the null of zero correlation in the richest regions. Column
4 shows that this result holds also when we include regional dummies to control for unobservable
di↵erences in local characteristics.34
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is consistent with the presence of significant
di↵erences in managerial assignment frictions across countries. These findings are complementary
to Alder (2016), who develops a similar idea in the context of a calibrated macro model and finds
deviations from assortative matching to have large e↵ects on output and TFP across countries.
More broadly, this evidence is in line with a recent strand of the literature (see, for example,
Hsieh and Klenow 2009) that sees misallocation of factors of production—in this case, managerial
inputs—as a key driver of di↵erences in economic development across countries.
34Note that if the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance were mostly driven by firm traits,
we would expect it to be stronger in higher-income areas, where shareholders have in principle more control over
their CEOs thanks to better governance and contract enforcement. In this light, the cross-country and cross-regional
evidence presented in this section suggest that the e↵ect of assignment frictions may actually overweigh that driven
by unobservable firm traits.
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5 The Productivity Cost of Misallocation
While the results of the previous section suggest that misassignment plays an important role in
generating the cross-sectional correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance, they cannot
shed light on its severity. Recall from section 4.1 that the assignment-specific component of the
cross-sectional correlation is approximated by (1  s0) , where s0 is the share of correctly assigned
behavior-0 CEOs and   is the productivity loss from hiring the wrong CEO. The same cross-
sectional correlation can be generated by a model with pure vertical di↵erentiation (s0 = 0 and a
lower value of  ) and a model with type-0 firms (s0 2 (0, 1) and a higher value of  ). A similar
issue arises in interpreting the di↵erences across regions: they could equally arise from substantial
di↵erences in assignment frictions or small di↵erences combined with a large  .
This section builds a statistical model to address both issues using cross-sectional data. It first
finds evidence consistent with the existence of both firm types so that demand exists for both CEO
behaviors. We then use the model to quantify the productivity loss due to misassignment, and
compute the share of the productivity gap between rich and poor countries that can be attributed
to incorrect CEO-firm assignments.
5.1 Statistical model
The main data input of the model is firms’ conditional productivity; that is, the residuals of a
regression of productivity on firm characteristics as estimated in Column (1), Table 1. However, we
omit the country fixed e↵ects, and instead estimate them as part of firms’ baseline productivities
below. We denote the residual of firm f run by CEO i as b"if .35
In line with the theory presented in Section 3, we adopt the statistical model b"if =  f +
(⌧f = xi) + vif , where  f is a “baseline” productivity; ⌧f 2 {0, 1} is the firm’s type; xi 2 {0, 1}
is the CEO’s behavior; and   is the productivity di↵erence between firms with the “right” CEO
and firms with the “wrong” CEO behavior relative to firm needs.
Throughout this section we assume the conditions of Proposition 2 hold. To obtain an empirical
proxy of xi we use bxi = ⇣b✓i >= 0.5⌘. While we treat bxi as observed data, ⌧f is a random variable.
Since all CEOs with bxi = 1 are correctly assigned, whenever we observe bxi = 1 we also must have
⌧f = 1.
In contrast, only a share s0 of CEOs with bxi = 0 is correctly assigned: when we observe bxi = 0,
⌧f = 0 with probability s0 2 [0, 1]; otherwise, with probability 1  s0 the CEO is misassigned and
⌧f = 1. Note that the model nests both pure vertical and pure horizontal di↵erentiation. In the
case of pure vertical di↵erentiation s0 = 0; that is, all CEOs with bxi = 0 are misassigned because
there is no demand for their behavior. Vice versa, in the case of pure horizontal di↵erentiation
35To maintain comparability in the pooled vs. regional results, we also limit the sample to those firms for which
there is at least one observation per region, industry, and year, since these are used as controls in the estimation of
the residuals. This leaves 851 observations out of 920.
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s0 = 1; that is, all CEOs with bxi = 0 are assigned to firms that demand their behavior. As for the
baseline productivity, we model  f = xcf ,⌧f where cf denotes the country in which firm f operates.
We also assume that xcf ,1 = A + xcf ,0 so that the baseline productivity of type 1 firms is that
of type 0 firms plus a common constant term. This formulation allows for observed productivity
di↵erences between firms run by CEOs with di↵erent behaviors to arise from factors innate to
firm types in addition to the assignment friction channel. Finally, we treat vif as a mean-zero
normal random variable whose variance is both country and assignment specific:  21,cf ( 
2
0,cf
) is the
standard deviation of residuals in an e cient (ine cient) CEO-firm pair.
Given these observations, the likelihood function can be written as
Y
f2⇥(0)
8>><>>:
s0p
2⇡ H,cf
exp

  1
2 2H,cf
 b"if   xcf ,0    2 +
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#
. (5)
where ⇥(0) and ⇥(1) are the sets of firms managed by CEOs with behaviors 0 and 1, respectively.
Behavior-1 CEOs are always e ciently assigned to type-1 firms and their residuals are drawn from
a normal distribution with mean A+xcf ,0+ ; in contrast, firms managed by behavior-0 CEOs have
their residuals drawn from a mixture of two normals, one with mean xcf ,0 +  if the assignment is
e cient and another with mean A + xcf ,1 if the assignment is ine cient. The mixing probability
is simply s0, the probability that CEOs with behavior 0 are assigned to type-0 firms. We use the
EM algorithm to maximize (5).
The A parameter is estimated to be -.026. Since the EM algorithm does not directly yield
standard errors, we formally test the restriction A = 0 by plugging this value into (5) and max-
imizing with respect to the other parameters. A simple likelihood ratio test then fails to reject
the restriction (the associated p-value is 0.706). Intuitively, when we divide behavior-0 CEOs into
two groups, one with high performance and one with low performance, the high-performing group
has productivity residuals with a mean statistically indistinguishable from that of the residuals of
behavior-1 CEOs. (Note that in the E-step we explicitly infer the probability that behavior 0 CEOs
are e ciently assigned, which allows us to then estimate parameters in the M-step).
As is standard, the log likelihood is defined under the assumptions of the theoretical model,
namely that   > 0, and that behavior-1 CEOs are scarce and all correctly assigned; thus, while
there are combinations of parameters with A > 0 and   = 0 that produce the same value of the
likelihood, these violate the basic assumption of the model that correctly assigned firm-CEO pairs
are more productive. Of course, nothing in the statistical model rules out both   > 0 and A > 0
but, importantly, we find no role for A when we optimize (5) beginning from the best-fit solution
with   > 0.
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The estimate of   is 0.532, which implies that the loss associated with an incorrect assignment
is substantial. Given that the units of the residual are log points, the estimate implies that moving
from a correct assignment to an incorrect one reduces firm productivity by exp(0.532) 1exp(0.532) , or around
41%.
The estimated s0 is 0.744. To test whether the data are consistent with pure vertical di↵eren-
tiation, we impose the restriction s0 = 0 in (5), which a likelihood ratio test rejects with a p-value
of 0.00202. This is an important finding since the reduced-form results cannot distinguish pure
vertical di↵erentiation from a model with firm types. The key underlying property of the data that
lets us test s0 = 0 is that under this restriction behavior-1 CEOs uniformly outperform behavior-0
CEOs. We can reject this in favor of a mixture model with s0 > 0 since we observe a large fraction
of behavior-0 CEOs whose performance is similar to that of behavior-1 CEOs. Also, note that
once we reject s0 = 0 we must necessarily reject s0 = 1 because in both cases we fit two mean
parameters, while in the former we also fit two variance parameters (per country), whereas the
latter is more restricted with one variance parameter. Overall, then, a model with heterogenous
firms and assignment frictions fits the data significantly better than one without firm heterogeneity
(pure vertical di↵erentiation) or one without such frictions (pure horizontal di↵erentiation).
5.2 Misallocation and Development
The model also allows us to quantify the productivity losses due to the misallocation of CEOs to
firms. Following Section 4.2.2, we use the distinction between high- and low/middle-income regions
to proxy for di↵erent intensities in assignment frictions, and we quantify the productivity losses in
the sample as a whole, and separately for the two subsets of countries.
To quantify the share of misassignments, we first derive   , i.e. the share of type-1 firms, from
the market clearing condition. Overall we observe a share b  = 0.347 of CEOs who adopt behavior
1. We must then have   = b  + (1  b )(1  s0). The right-hand side of this expression is the total
share of CEOs assigned to type-1 firms: all behavior-1 CEOs and a portion 1   s0 of behavior-0
CEOs. Plugging in for b  and s0, we obtain   = 0.514 so that slightly over half of firms have type
1. This in turn implies that a share    b  = 0.168 of firms are misassigned in our data, leading to
an overall productivity loss of 0.089 (= 0.168 ⇤ ) log points.
We then allow the s0 parameter in the likelihood function (5) to vary according to whether
the firm operates in a low/middle- or high-income country. We restrict A = 0 in line with the
results above. The estimation results are in table 4. Confirming the notable di↵erences in figure
7, behavior 0 CEOs in low/middle income countries are e ciently assigned with probability 0.546,
while the corresponding probability for behavior-0 CEOs in high-income countries is 0.893. The
derived parameters in the table are obtained using the same steps as described above.
One possible explanation for these di↵erent probabilities across countries is that firms in high-
income countries have higher demand for behavior 1. Indeed, consistent with this idea, the data
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Table 4: Estimation Results by Region
Notes: In its first two columns, this table displays the estimated parameters resulting from maximizing (5) using the
EM algorithm under the restriction that A = 0. The third column is the observed share of high-index CEOs in each
region. The fourth is the value of   consistent with market-clearing given s0 and the observed shared of high-index
CEOs, while the fifth is the di↵erence between the fourth and third, as this gives the share of type-1 firms run by
behavior-0 CEOs.
shows a much larger share of behavior-1 CEOs in high-income countries relative to low/middle-
income countries (0.495 vs. 0.216). However, note that the   parameters we extract—which capture
the share of type-1 firms—are in fact very similar in both regions (if anything there is slightly higher
demand for behavior 1 in poorer countries).36
Instead, the main di↵erence between regions emerging from the exercise is that type-1 firms in
low/middle-income countries are unable to locate and hire behavior-1 CEOs. It is important to
reiterate that this is not necessarily due to scarcity of behavior-1 CEOs in the population per se.
Rather, barriers to the allocation of talent might prevent the right individuals from entering the
CEO job market. Regardless of the deeper cause, the share of ine ciently assigned type-1 firms in
these countries is 0.356, compared to 0.054 in high-income countries. While there is still a sizable
number of ine cient assignments in richer countries, the share in poorer countries is over six times
as large.37
To conclude, we use our estimates to quantify how much productivity in India and Brazil would
increase if the assignment process were as e cient as in the richer countries in the sample. This
implies building a counterfactual where q increases from 0.546 to 0.893, which requires the share of
high-index CEOs to increase from 0.216 to 0.521 to maintain market clearing, and which yields a
drop in the share of misassigned firms from 0.356 to 0.051. Given that the productivity di↵erence
  is now estimated at a somewhat higher value of 0.667, productivity would increase by 0.203 log
36We have repeated the same chi-squared tests for restrictions on q as described above for each region separately.
While the power of the tests is lower due to reduced sample size, we are able to reject pure vertical and horizontal
di↵erentiation at a 10% significance level in both regions.
37Our findings provide a counterpoint to Chade and Eeckhout (2016), who estimate the degree of mismatch in the
US CEO labor market using wage data. First, while they find substantial mismatch based on the deviation of the
observed wage distribution from what a model with perfect matching on observables would predict, our estimates
that explicitly incorporate heterogeneity in CEO behavior indicate little mismatch in high-income countries. Second,
they argue that nearly all match productivity di↵erences arise from firm rather than CEO characteristics, whereas
we find an important role for CEO heterogeneity.
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points.
We benchmark this magnitude against the macro di↵erences in labor productivity across coun-
tries observed in the time interval covered by our survey and productivity data (2010-2014) using
the Penn World Table data v.9 (Feenstra and Timmer, 2015). The average di↵erences in log labor
productivity between the two subsets of countries is 1.560. Therefore, improving the allocation of
CEOs to firms in low/middle income countries could account for up to 13% of the cross-country
di↵erences in labor productivity.38
6 Conclusions
This paper combines a new survey methodology with a machine learning algorithm to measure
the behavior of CEOs in large samples. We show that CEOs di↵er in their behavior along several
dimensions. Guided by a simple firm-CEO assignment model, we show that while there is no “best
practice” in CEO behavior—that is a behavior that is optimal for all the firms—there is evidence of
significant frictions in the assignment of CEOs to firms. In our sample of manufacturing firms across
six countries we estimate that 17% of firm-CEO pairs are misassigned and that misassignments are
found in all regions but are more frequent in emerging economies. The consequences for productivity
are large: the implied productivity loss due to di↵erential misassignment is equal to 13% of the
labor productivity gap between firms in high- and middle/low-income countries in our sample.
While this paper has intentionally taken an agnostic approach to defining the relationship be-
tween the observed CEO behaviors and more general notions of leadership, an obvious next step
would be to explore in more detail the precise mechanisms through which di↵erent administrative
behaviors a↵ect firm performance, and why di↵erent firms need di↵erent behaviors. The CEO
behavior that according to our firm-CEO assignment model and our data is scarcer in the popula-
tion of actual CEOs (and hence produces a better average performance), features multi-functional
meetings and a focus on higher-level executives rather than production functions. One tentative
interpretation is that a CEO that displays this pattern of behavior is a general manager, who pri-
marily coordinates at a high level, delegates operational tasks to other executives and spends his
time ensuring good communication in the top management team. On the other hand, the other
pattern of behavior may be more closely associated with the role of an operating manager, who
tends to intervene directly in operational aspects, prefers one-on-one meetings with a variety of
internal and external constituents, and puts less emphasis on cross-functional coordination.
To the best of our knowledge, while the general idea of leader types is present in recent papers
in the economic leadership literature, the dichotomy between general and operational managers is
38The average labor productivity for high (low/middle) income countries in our sample is 11.4 (9.83). These values
are calculated using data on output-side real GDP at chained PPPs and the total number of persons engaged from
the Penn World Tables.
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much less prominent in this literature—within and outside economics.39 Future work could utilize
information about CEO behavior to inform alternative leadership models, and in particular explore
the underlying firm-CEO matching function, which is not dealt with explicitly in the current paper.
Furthermore, a possible next step of this research would be to extend the data collection to the
diaries of multiple managerial figures beyond the CEO. This approach would allow us to further
explore the importance of managerial interactions and team behavior (Hambrick and Mason, 1984),
which are also now largely absent from our analysis. We leave these topics for further research.
39A notable exception in this respect is Barnard (1938), who emphasizes the coordinative role of top executives in
large ad complex organizations.
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Appendix Tables and Figures - Not for Publication
A Data Appendix
A.1 The Time Use Survey
The time use survey took place in two stages: in the Spring of 2011 a team of 15 analysts based
in Mumbai and led by one of our project managers collected data on India, while the rest of the
countries were covered in a second survey wave in the Spring of 2013 by a team of 40 enumerators
based at the London School of Economics.40 To ensure comparability, we adopted the same protocol
and retained the same project manager across both waves. The enumerators where typically grad-
uate students (often MBAs) recruited specifically for this project. All enumerators were subject
to a common intensive training on the survey methodology for three days at the beginning of the
project, plus weekly team progress reviews and one to one conversations with their supervisors to
discuss possible uncertainties with respect to the classification of the time use data. Each interview
was checked o↵ at the end of the week by one supervisor, who would make sure that the data was
complete in every field, and that the enumerator had codified all the activities according to the
survey protocol. Each enumerator ran on average 30 interviews.
Each enumerator was allocated a random list of about 120 companies, and was in charge of
calling up the numbers of his or her list to convince the CEO to participate in the survey, and to
collect the time use data in the week allocated to the CEO. One project manager, five full time
supervisors and one additional manager working on a part time basis led the survey team. We
actively monitored and coached the enumerators throughout the project, which intensified their
persistence in chasing the CEOs and getting them to participate. We also o↵ered the CEOs a
personalized analysis of their use of time (which was sent to them in January 2012 to the Indian
CEOs and in June 2014 to the rest of the countries) to give them the ability to monitor their time
allocation, and compare it with peers in the industry.
The survey instrument is available at www.executivetimeusesurvey.org. A screenshot of the
blank instrument is shown in Figure A.1.
A.2 Sampling Frame
The sampling frame was drawn from ORBIS, an extensive commercial data set that contains
company accounts for several millions of companies around the world. Our sampling criteria were
as follows. First, we restricted the sample to manufacturing and additionally kept firms that were
classified as “active” in the year prior to the survey (2010 in India and 2012 for the other countries)
and with available recent accounting data.41These conditions restricted our sample to 11,500 firms.
Second, we further restricted the sample to companies for which we could find CEOs contact details.
40The data collection methodology discussed in this section is an evolution of the approach followed in Bandiera
et al. (2012) to collect data on the diary of 100 Italian CEOs. While the data collection of the Italian data was
outsourced to a private firm, the data collection described in this paper was internally managed from beginning to
end. Due to this basic methodological di↵erence and other changes introduced after the Italian data was collected
(e.g. the vector of features used to characterize every activity) we decided not to combine the two samples.
41For the Indian sample, we also restricted the sample to firms headquartered in the fifteen main Indian states.
This excluded firms located in Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh, Dadra, Daman and Diu, Goa, Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Orissa and Uttarakhand, each of which accounts for less than 3% of
Indian GDP.
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Figure A.1: Survey Instrument
Appendix Figure 1 - Survey Instrument
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Table A.1: Selection AnalysisTable A1 -  Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All All All
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if CEO participated
Country=Brazil 0.677*** 0.695*** 0.655*** 0.559*
(0.074) (0.075) (0.079) (0.288)
Country=France 0.210*** 0.256*** 0.143 0.562**
(0.073) (0.074) (0.104) (0.221)
Country=Germany 0.115 0.194** 0.152* 0.476**
(0.072) (0.078) (0.082) (0.222)
Country=India 0.658*** 0.699** 1.227*** 0.672
(0.247) (0.272) (0.371) (0.425)
Country=UK -0.178** -0.139* -0.153** 0.088
(0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.218)
Ln(Sales) -0.071***
(0.011)
ln(Sales/Employees) -0.018
(0.030)
ROCE 0.000
(0.001)
Number of firms 6256 5993 4090 3492
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by
probit (marginal effects reported, robust standard errors under coefficient). The dependent
variable in all columns is a dummy=1 if the CEO participated in the survey. The selection
regression is run on the latest available year of accounting data. All columns include 2 digits SIC
industry dummies.
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by
probit (marginal e↵ects reported, robust standard errors under coe cient). The dependent variable
in all columns is a dummy=1 if the CEO participated in the survey. The selection regression is run
on the latest available year of accounting data. All columns include 2 digits SIC industry dummies.
To gather contact information we hired a team of research assistants based in Mumbai, London and
Boston who verified the CEOs names and found their phone numbers and emails. This restricted
the sample to 7,744 firms. Of these, 907 later resulted not to be eligible for the interviews upon the
first telephonic contact (the reasons for non eligibility included recent bankruptcy or the company
not being in manufacturing), and 310 were never contacted because the project ended before this
was possible. The final number of eligible companies was thus 6,527, with median yearly sales of
$53,000,000. Of these, we were able to secure an interview with 1,131 CEOs, although 17 CEOs
dropped out before the end of the data collection week for personal reasons and were thus removed
from the sample before the analysis was conducted.
The selection analysis in Table A.1 shows that firms in the final sample have on average slightly
lower log sales relative to the sampling frame (coe cient 0.071, standard error 0.011). However,
we do not find any significant selection e↵ect on performance variables, such as labor productivity
(sales over employees) and return on capital employed (ROCE).
Table A.2 presents the basic summary statistics of the sample.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Observations 
A. CEOs Traits
CEO age 50.93 52.00 8.45 1107
CEO gender 0.96 1.00 0.19 1114
CEO has college degree 0.92 1.00 0.27 1114
CEO has MBA 0.55 1.00 0.50 1114
CEO tenure in post 10.29 7.00 9.55 1110
B. Firms Traits
Employment 1,275.47     300.00        6,497.72        1114
Sales ('000 $) 222,033.90  35,340.49   1,526,261.00  920
Capital ('000 $) 79,436.72    10,029.00   488,953.60     618
Materials ('000 $) 157,287.10  25,560.02   1,396,475.00  448
Profits per employee ('000 $) 8.62            2.55           14.87             386
Notes: Variables in Panel A and B are drawn from our survey and ORBIS, respectively. Notes: Variables in Panel A and B are drawn from our survey and ORBIS, respectively.
Table B.1: Five Most Common Activities in Pure Behavior 0
Type Planned Duration Size Functions Prob. in  0 Prob. in  1
Meeting Yes Long Large Production 0.057 0.000
Meeting Yes Long Small Clients 0.027 0.000
Meeting Yes Long Small Production 0.025 0.012
Meeting Yes Long Large Marketing 0.024 0.012
Meeting Yes Long Large Marketing/Production 0.023 0.000
B Further Results from LDA Model
B.1 Most common activities in each pure behavior
These tables display the most common activities in each pure behavior. In the duration category,
long refers to an activity’s lasting longer than one hour; in the size category, small refers to an
activity’s involving just one other person, while large refers to its involving more than one person.
Regarding functions, groupcom refers to members of the firm’s commercial group, and associations
are trade association meetings.
B.2 Significance of Di↵erences in Pure Behaviors
A natural question is whether the di↵erence in pure behaviors is significant. To explore this, we
adopt the following approach. First, we generate a dataset of activities based upon a model in which
there are no underlying di↵erences among CEOs. Specifically, we take the empirical distribution of
the 654 activities that enter the LDA analysis and for each time unit draw an activity independently
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Table B.2: Five Most Common Activities in Pure Behavior 1
Type Planned Duration Size Functions Prob. in  0 Prob. in  1
Meeting Yes Long Large C-suite 0.057 0.000
Meeting Yes Long Large Others 0.027 0.000
Meeting Yes Long Large Associations 0.025 0.012
Meeting Yes Long Large Marketing/Clients 0.024 0.012
Meeting Yes Long Large Board 0.023 0.000
from it. This corresponds to a model in which there is a single pure behavior from which all CEOs
draw their observed activities. We then estimate the same parameters on this simulated data as
we do on the actual data, and compute the Hellinger distance between the two estimated pure
behaviors. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times.
Figure B.1 plots the distribution of the Hellinger distances in the 1,000 simulations. The red
line denotes the Hellinger distance we observe observe in the actual data. In no simulation does the
Hellinger distance between two behaviors exceed that we observe in the actual data: the maximum
simulated distance is 0.412 whereas in the actual data the distance is 0.776. We therefore conclude
that it is highly unlikely that our observed data is consistent with a model in which all CEOs adopt
a single pure behavior.
B.3 Estimated time shares
We also report the raw and estimated time shares in the baseline sample in table B.3. The raw shares
are simply the shares of time that the average CEO is observed to spend in di↵erent categories.
These di↵er slightly from those displayed in figure 1 since we only compute averages on the subset
of activities that include non-rare feature combinations. The estimated shares are the fraction of
time each behavior spends in each category, weighted by the average value of the CEO behavior
index. In general there is a very close relationship between the raw and estimated shares. The
largest deviations occur for time with outsiders and with insiders and outsiders together. However
these are derived from the probabilities each behavior places on di↵erent combinations of individual
functions rather than a feature explicitly included in the algorithm.
C Proof of Proposition 2
We verify that the situation described in the proposition corresponds to a Bayesian equilibrium.
To simplify notation re-normalize all variables so that   = 1.
First note, that if B > 1, all CEOs will choose the behavior that is optimal for the firm that
hires them. This means that CEO behavior only depends on firm type. Therefore, in what follows
we assume that governance is su ciently poor, so B < c.
In that case, when a CEO is hired, her utility is w¯+B if she works for a firm of the same type
and w¯ if she works for a firm of a di↵erent type. To simplify notation, further normalize w¯+B = 1.
Hence the utility of a correctly matched CEO is one and the utility of a mismatched CEO is
b ⌘ w¯
w¯ +B
.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of Hellinger Distances in Simulated Data
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Table B.3: Raw and Estimated Time Shares
tab_shares_1612
Page 1
Raw Estimated
Meeting 0.803 0.801
Communications 0.068 0.06
Site Visit 0.06 0.062
Insiders 0.657 0.653
Outsiders 0.235 0.175
Insiders & Outsiders 0.108 0.171
Production 0.35 0.355
Marketing 0.206 0.208
C-suite 0.115 0.122
Clients 0.103 0.104
Suppliers 0.064 0.068
Consultants 0.026 0.026
Planned 0.764 0.782
>1 Hour 0.657 0.687
2 People or More 0.553 0.573
2 Functions or More 0.273 0.262
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Note that b is a measure of the quality of governance, with b = 1, being the worst level of governance.
A type-0 firm faces an abundant supply of type-0 CEOs. As all the applications it receives
come from type-0 CEOs, the firm will simply hire the first applicant. A type-1 firm instead may
receive applications from both CEO types. If k is su ciently low, the optimal policy consists in
waiting for the first candidate with s = 1 and hire him.
We now consider CEOs. Suppose that all type-1 CEOs apply to type-1 firms and type-0 CEOs
apply to type-1 firms with probability z and to type-0 firms with probability 1  z.
If a type-0 CEO applies to a type-0 firm, he will get a job if and only if his application is
downloaded. The mass of type-0 firms is 1  . The mass of type-0 CEOs applying to type-0 firms
is (1   ) (1  z)m. The probability the CEO is hired is
P0 =
1   
(1   ) (1  z)m.
If instead a type-0 CEO applies to a type-1 firm, he will get a job if and only if his application
is considered and the firm does not detect deception. Computing the first probability requires
an additional step, because some firms consider more than one application before they find an
application which passes the screening process.
The probability that a type-1 firm application is accepted if it is considered is:
H =
(1   ) z (1  ⇢) +  
(1   ) z +   .
The mass of applications that are downloaded by type-1 firms is therefore:
 
 
1 + (1 H) + (1 H)2 + ...  =   1
H
.
Given that the mass of applicants to type-1 firms is m ((1   ) z +  ), the probability that an
application is considered is
 
m (  + (1   ) z)H =
 
m ((1   ) z (1  ⇢) +  )
The probability that a type-0 applicant passes the screening process is 1  ⇢. Thus, the proba-
bility that a type-0 applicant is hired by a type-1 firm is
P1 =
(1  ⇢) 
m ((1   ) z (1  ⇢) +  ) .
In the equilibrium under consideration a type-0 CEO must be indi↵erent between applying to
the two types of firms. As the benefit of being hired by a same-type firm is one, while the benefit
of being hired by a type-1 firm is b, the indi↵erence condition is P0 = bP1, which yields:
1   
(1   ) (1  z) =
(1  ⇢) b
((1   ) z (1  ⇢) +  ) ,
yielding
z =
(1   ) (1  ⇢) b  (1   )  
(1   +  b) (1   ) (1  ⇢) .
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The solution of z will be positive – meaning that some 0-types will apply to 1-firms – if
⇢ < 1  (1   )  
(1   ) b ,
which is satisfied as long as ⇢ is not too high, b is not too low, and   is su ciently smaller than  .
For instance, the combination of ⇢ = 0, b = 1, and   >   would work.
Type-1 CEOs always produce 1, while the average productivity of a type-0 CEO is equal to the
probability that he is matched with a type 0 firm, which is
1  z
1  z + z (1  ⇢) .
By replacing z, we find the average productivity of a type-0 CEO:
(1   ) ((1   ) (1  ⇢) +  )
(1   ) (1   ) (1  ⇢) + (1   )   + ((1   ) (1  ⇢) b  (1   )  ) (1  ⇢) ,
which is smaller than one whenever ⇢ < 1.
Finally, note that the di↵erence between the profit (including CEO compensation) of a correctly
matched firm and an incorrectly matched one is 1 B.
D Dynamic Implications of the Assignment Model
We now explore the dynamic implications of our CEO-firm assignment model. Suppose that we
know the behavior of the current CEO, but not the type of the firm and the behavior of the previous
CEO. What can we say about the evolution of firm performance over time?
Let us assume that the conditions for Proposition 2 are satisfied. There are two types of CEOs
(i 2 {0, 1}) and two types of firms (j 2 {0, 1}). We assume that the abundant CEO type is i = 0.
Using a reduced form expression from the previous section, assume that the performance of a firm
is yj + xij , where xij = 1 if the firm type and the CEO type match (i = j) and xij = 0 if there is a
mismatch (i 6= j)xij , and the term yj indicate that the two firm types may have di↵erent baseline
productivities.
Let us consider a firm whose CEO is replaced at time 0. Let xoldij and x
new
ij denote the match
quality of the previous CEO and the current CEO, respectively. The performance of the firm at
time t < 0 was determined uniquely by the performance of the old CEO (thus assuming that he
had been in the job su ciently long). The performance at t   0 is given by
Yt = yj + (1  ↵t)xoldij + ↵txnewij ,
where ↵t is increasing and s-shaped in t. Namely,↵0 = 0,↵0t > 0, limt!0+↵0t = 0, limt!1↵t = 1,
and ↵”t > 0 if t is low and ↵”t < 0 if t is high. As time passes, the company’s performance is
determined more and more by the type of the new CEO as his tenure increases. The s-shaped
assumption captures the idea that the e↵ect of a new CEO is limited in the beginning, it increases
with time, but then it reaches a stable plateau.
Consider a large sample of firms. Suppose we observe the type of the current CEO, but we do
not observe the type of the previous CEO, nor the type of the firm. What can we say about them?
46
If the current CEO belongs to the scarce type, we know for sure that the firm has type-1. The
previous CEO was the scarce type too with probability ⇡ and the abundant-type with probability
1  ⇡.42
Focus on performance growth, taking t = 0 as the baseline year:  Yt = Yt   Y0. If the current
CEO belongs to the scarce type, we have
 Yt (i
new = 1) =
(
0 if t < 0⇣
(1  ↵t)E
h
xoldij |xnewij = 1
i
+ ↵t
⌘
  E
h
xoldij |xnewij = 1
i
if t > 0
but note that E
h
xoldij |xnewij = 1
i
= ⇡ < 1. Therefore,
 Yt (i
new = 1) =
⇢
0 if t < 0
↵t (1  ⇡) if t > 0 ,
which implies that average performance is flat before the CEO replacement and follows ↵t (1  ⇡)
thereafter.
If instead we consider a sample of firms run by abundant-type CEOs, a specular argument
applies: we would observe that the average performance decreases after the current CEO is hired
and follows a similarly s-shaped curve. Therefore we have:
Proposition 3 The average performance of a sample of firms who are currently run by scarce-
type (abundant-type) CEOs was flat before the new CEOs were hired and it becomes increasing
(decreasing) and s-shaped thereafter.
Figure D.1depicts the average performance of a set of firms run by scarce-type CEOs, Yt (inew = 1),
under the assumption that ↵t is a sigmoid function (↵t = t/
p
1 + t2) and ⇡ = 12 . The average
e↵ect of having a scarce-type CEO is positive, gradual, and s-shaped. This result implies that if
we observe a set of firms run by scarce type CEOs who were all hired at the same date, we should
predict that the average performance of those firms is constant before the CEOs are hired, almost
constant right after they are hired, and increasing and s-shaped afterwards.
E Additional Results
E.1 CEO Behavior Index: Additional Descriptives
E.1.1 Variation across Countries and Industries
Figure E.1 shows the point estimates and confidence intervals of the regression of the CEO behavior
index on, respectively, country (using the US as relative country benchmark) and SIC 2 industry
dummies.
42This probability is given in equilibrium by
⇡ =
 
  + (1   ) z ,
where
z =
(1   ) (1  ⇢)     (1   )
(1   ) (1  ⇢) .
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Figure D.1: Average performance of firms run by type-1 CEOs
Country and industry fixed e↵ects together account for 17% of the variance in the CEO behavior
index. This is due primarily do the fact that the CEO behavior index varies by country, and in
particular it is significantly higher in rich countries (France, Germany, UK and US), relative to
low and middle income countries (Brazil and India). In contrast, industry fixed e↵ects are largely
insignificant.
E.1.2 Correlation with Firm and CEO Characteristics
Panel A, Figure E.2 reports the correlation between CEO behavior and firm/CEO traits controlling
for country and industry fixed e↵ects. Larger firms, multinationals, listed firms and firms that have
a COO are all more likely to hire a high-index CEO.
The index is also correlated with specific CEO characteristics, as shown in Panel B. It is sig-
nificantly larger for CEOs who report having had a study or work experience outside their home
country, or to have attained an MBA degree or equivalent. In contrast, there is no evidence that
the index is related to the age of the executive, or to whether the CEO was promoted to the role
within the organization.
E.2 Production Function: Robustness Checks
We have examined the robustness of the basic results discussed in Table 1. The robustness checks
are summarized in Tables E.1 and E.2. In each table, Column 1 simply reports the baseline results
of Table 1, column 1.
E.2.1 Using shares of time instead of the CEO Behavior Index
Table E.1 shows the basic production function results when we use the share of time spent by
CEOs in activities with di↵erent features rather than the CEO index. Starting with activity type,
Column 2 shows that there is a negative and precisely estimated correlation between the time
spent in plant visits and performance, while the correlation with time spent in communications is
48
Figure E.1: CEO Behavior Index: Variation across Countries and SIC 2 industries
Figure 3
Panel A - CEO Behavior Index and Firm Characteristics Panel B - CEO Behavior Index and CEO Characteristics
Panel A - CEO Behavior by Country (relative to the US) Panel B - CEO Behavior by Industry
Notes: Each point represents the coefficient obtained when regressing the CEO behavior index on each dummy variable, including country dummies as additional
controls.
Notes: Each point represents the coefficient obtained when regressing
the CEO behavior index on a full set of SIC2 industry dummies,
including country dummies as additional controls.
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Figure E.2: CEO Behavior Index, Firm and CEO Characteristics
Figure 3
Panel A - CEO Behavior Index and Firm Characteristics Panel B - CEO Behavior Index and CEO Characteristics
Panel A - CEO Behavior by Country (relative to the US) Panel B - CEO Behavior by Industry
Notes: Each point represents the coefficient obtained when regressing the CEO behavior index on each dummy variable, including country dummies as additional
controls.
Notes: Each point represents the coefficient obtained when regressing
the CEO behavior index on a full set of SIC2 industry dummies,
including country dummies as additional controls.
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positive but not precisely estimated (all relative to time spent in meetings). Column 3 shows that
among participants, firm performance is higher when CEOs devote more time to insiders together
with outsiders as opposed to outsiders or insiders alone. Moving to specific functions, Column 3
shows that performance is negatively correlated with the time spent with production and clients
and positively correlated with time spent with C-suite executives and marketing. Column 5 shows
that performance is positively correlated with planning and multi-functional and multi-participant
interactions but not with meeting duration. Taken together, the results suggests that most of the
features for which CEOs with di↵erent indexes behave similarly (meetings, insiders, group size) are
not correlated with performance. The sole exception is the share of planned time, which is positively
correlated with performance but not with the index. Moreover, all the di↵erences captured by our
index (site vs communication, outsiders alone vs with insiders, production and clients vs. C-suite,
single function vs multifunction interactions) are individually correlated with firm performance.
E.2.2 Alternative specification choices
We examined whether the results varied when we used annual accounting data, instead of the
averaged version employed in the baseline regressions. Table (E.2), Panel A, column 2 shows that
the baseline results are not sensitive to this choice. In column 3 we show that the unweighted
regressions deliver a very similar coe cient on the CEO behavior index relative to the baseline
results, which are weighted by the representativeness of the week as rated by the CEO at the end
of the data collection week.
E.2.3 Controlling for CEO and firm characteristics
We investigated whether the coe cient of the CEO behavior index in the baseline result could
capture the e↵ect of other CEO or firm observables, which could be at the same time correlated
with CEO behavior and firm performance. In column 4 we show that the coe cient on the index
actually increases when we control for the overall number of hours worked by the CEO during
the survey week, a proxy for e↵ort which was extensively analyzed in Bandiera et al. (2013). In
columns 5 and 6 we include a set of firm dummies to denote whether the firm is a multinational,
part of a group, owned and run by a family CEO, listed on a public exchange and has a COO in
the organizational chart, and CEO characteristics (dummies to capture whether the CEO holds an
MBA degree or equivalent, has studied or worked abroad, is male, was promoted internally and
age). While these additional variables are for the most part insignificant, the coe cient on the
CEO behavior index remains large and statistically significant.43
E.2.4 Alternative ways of expressing the CEO behavior Index, including alternative
dimensionality reduction techniques
We experimented with di↵erent ways of expressing the CEO behavior index.
First, we used a discretized version of the index (=1 if the index is   0.5), as shown in Ta-
ble (E.2), Panel A, column 7. We also examined alternative dimensionality reduction approaches,
namely PCA and k-means analysis, on the key marginals that emerge from LDA as being signifi-
cantly di↵erent across behavior types. For each CEO, we counted the number of engagements that:
43Among the firm variables, the only significant ones are the family CEO dummy (negative) and the COO dummy
(positive). Among the CEO variables, the only significant ones are the log of CEO age and the dummy to capture
experience abroad, both positive.
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(1) last longer than one hour; (2) are planned; (3) involve two or more people; (4) involve outsiders
alone; (5) involve high-level inside functions; and (6) involve more than one function.
The first principal component in PCA analysis explains 36% of the variance in this feature
space and places a positive weight on all dimensions except (4). Meanwhile, k-means clustering
produces one centroid with higher values on all dimensions except (4) (and, ipso facto, a second
centroid with a higher value for (4) and lower values for all others). Hence the patterns identified
using simpler methods validate the key di↵erences from LDA with two pure behaviors. 44 In the
columns 8 and 9 of Table E.2, Panel A we show that these alternative ways of classifying CEOs do
not fundamentally alter the relationship between behavior and firm performance.
E.2.5 Activity selection
In the baseline analysis, we define a rare activity as one not present in the time use of at least 30
CEOs. When we drop these activities from the analysis, we discard 23% of interactive activities
on average across CEOs. One potential concern is that the choice of rare activities itself is a
component of behavior that we do not capture with the behavior index. To address this, we
construct a behavior index based on dropping activities not present in the time use of at least 15
and, alternatively, 45 CEOs. The results are presented in Table (E.2), Panel B, columns 2 and 3.
The results are essentially identical as for the baseline index.
In the baseline results, we build the index only on the basis of interactive activities, excluding
traveling. Column 4 shows that we would obtain very similar results if we were to include travel in
the set.
LDA is a mixed-membership model that allows CEOs to mix their time between two pure
behaviors. An alternative model is a simpler mixture model in which each CEO is associated
exclusively to one behavior. We have estimated a multinomial mixture model via the EM algorithm,
and derived an alternative behavior index as the probability that a CEO draws activities from
behavior 1. 45 Again, we find a significant relationship between the behavior index and firm
performance, as shown in Table (E.2), Panel B, column 5.
The behavior index in the main paper is based on all 1,114 CEOs in our time use survey, but
we have sales data for 920. We therefore also construct the index based on the subset of CEOs for
which sales data is available, but as column 6 shows this does not change the coe cient.
A final concern is that the di↵erences we capture in the behavior index arise solely from cross-
region variation in time use, and that within-region variation is not related to firm performance.
We therefore construct a behavior index for CEOs in low/middle-income countries based solely on
time use observed in these countries, and likewise for CEOs in the high-income countries. Column
7 shows the results on firm performance, and we again find a significant relationship.
E.2.6 Alternative estimation techniques
Table (E.2), Panel B, column 8 shows the results when we regress we regress the Olley Pakes
estimator of productivity on the CEO behavior index. Given the need to rely on panel data for
44Note that LDA is still a necessary first step in this analysis because it allows us to identify the important marginals
along which CEOs vary. We have experimented with PCA and k-means on the 654-dimensional feature space over
which we estimate the LDA model, but the results are much harder to analysis as described above.
45In the mixture model, each CEO draws all of his/her activities from a single pure behavior, but the econometrician
is unsure which behavior this is. The E-step in the EM algorithm provides a probability distribution over cluster
assignments, and we use the probability of being assigned to cluster 1 as the behavior index.
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Table E.1: Production Function Results Using Shares of Time
(1) (2) (4) (5) (3)
Dependent Variable: log(sales)
log(employment) 0.889*** 0.895*** 0.893*** 0.907*** 0.876***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
CEO behavior index 0.343***
(0.108)
Share of time spent in Communications 0.066
(0.253)
Share of time spent in Plant visits (site) -1.168***
(0.364)
Share of time spent with Insiders only 0.375**
(0.187)
Share of time spent with Insiders and Outsiders together -0.166
(0.166)
Share of time spent with Production 0.055
(0.175)
Share of time spent with Marketing 0.494***
(0.164)
Share of time spent with C-suite managers 0.247
(0.187)
Share of time spent with Clients 0.353
(0.237)
Share of time spent with Suppliers -0.661***
(0.235)
Share of time spent with Consultants 0.459
(0.299)
Share of time spent in Planned activities 0.373
(0.239)
Share of time spent in Interactions> 1hr -0.804**
(0.318)
Share of time spent in Interactions with more than 2 people -0.462
(0.603)
Share of time spent in interactions with more than 2 functions 0.281
(0.649)
Number of observations (firms) 920 920 920 920 920
Observations used to compute means 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All columns
include the same controls used in 1, column 1.
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Table E.2: Robustness Checks
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Experiment Baseline
Firm by year 
accounting 
data, cluster 
at the firm 
level No weighting
Control for 
hours 
worked
Control for 
firm 
observables
Control for 
CEO 
observables
Discretized 
version  (>=.5)
Principal 
Component K-means
Dependent Variable: Log sales
CEO behavior index 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.298*** 0.338*** 0.265** 0.309*** 0.234*** 0.119*** 0.259***
(0.108) (0.090) (0.104) (0.105) (0.114) (0.108) (0.064) (0.035) (0.074)
log(CEO hours worked) 0.297*
(0.159)
MNE  (dummy) 0.089
(0.078)
Part of a Group (dummy) 0.045
(0.084)
Family CEO (dummy) -0.215**
(0.093)
Listed (dummy) 0.143*
(0.085)
COO in the org (dummy) 0.143*
(0.079)
CEO has MBA (dummy) -0.048
(0.072)
CEO has Experience abroad (dummy) 0.189**
(0.080)
CEO age 0.354*
(0.181)
CEO is male (dummy) -0.126
(0.132)
CEO is an internal promotion (dummy) 0.063
(0.057)
Number of observations (firms) 920 2554 920 920 920 920 920 920 920
Observations used to compute means 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experiment Baseline
Exclude alla 
activities not 
present in at 
least 15 
CEOs
Exclude alla 
activities not 
present in at 
least 45 
CEOs
Include 
Travel and 
Email
Mixture 
model
Index 
computed on 
sales sample 
only
Index computed  
by high and low 
income 
countries 
separately
Olley Pakes 
productivity 
residual
Dependent Variable: Log sales
CEO behavior index 0.343*** 0.305*** 0.316*** 0.265*** 0.133** 0.347*** 0.292*** 0.470***
(0.108) (0.110) (0.102) (0.096) (0.064) (0.102) (0.081) (0.105)
Number of observations (firms) 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 562
Observations used to compute means 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 1,431
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All columns include the same controls used
in 1, column 1. Panel A: Column 2 uses yearly accounting data instead of firm level aggregates (always based a max on an
interval including 5 years per firm, during the CEO tenure in o ce). Column 3 shows unweighted results. Column 4 includes
as additional control the log of total hours worked by the CEO during the week. Column 5 includes as additional controls a set
of firm level characteristics (MNE status, part of a group, family CEO, listed firm dummies). Column 6 includes as additional
controls a set of CEO characteristics (MBA, study or work experience abroad, gender and internal promotion dummies and log
age). Column 7 uses the discretized version of the CEO behavior index (=1 if the index is   0.5). Column 8 uses an index
derived using the first principal component from PCA. Column 9 derives the index from a k-means clustering approach. Panel
B: Column 2 uses LDA excluding all activities that are not present in at least 15 CEO diaries, and column 3 does the same
using 45 diaries as a threshold. Column 4 builds the index using a Mixture Model. Column 5 computes the index with the
LDA method, but only using the activities of CEOs working in firms included in the production function sample. Column 6
applies the LDA approach di↵erently by high and low/middle income countries. Column 7 uses the CEO behavior index built
by high and low income country separately. Column 8 shows the results obtained when we regress the Olley Pakes estimator of
productivity on the CEO behavior index.
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capital, this restricts the sample to 562 firms. As a comparison, the OLS estimate of the CEO
behavior index on the same sample is 0.244 (standard error 0.107).
E.2.7 Choosing number of pure behaviors with out-of-sample prediction
As discussed in the main text, we choose two pure behaviors primarily for interpretability, but
an alternative is to choose the number of pure behaviors K based on a statistical criterion. We
adopt perhaps the most popular approach–cross-validation–in which K is chosen based on the
ability of the model to predict out-of-sample observations. We first randomly draw two-thirds of
our sample of CEOs as training data, and fit an LDA model for various values of K beginning
from K = 2. Then we take the estimated parameters and compute the goodness-of-fit for the test
data (the held-out one-third of CEOs) using perplexity, a standard measure in the machine learning
literature given by
exp
24 PNi=1PAa=1 ni,a log
⇣PK
k=1 ✓i,k 
k
a
⌘
PN
i=1 Ti
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where ni,a is the total number of times activity a appears in the time use of CEO i; ✓i,k is the
probability CEO i adopts pure behavior k;  ka is the probability that pure behavior k generates
activity a; and Ti is the total number of time units observed for CEO i. Here the relevant population
of CEOs is the test sample. We use the estimated value of  ka from the LDA estimation on the
training data, and a uniform distribution for ✓i,k to compute perplexity. We repeat this procedure
ten times, each time randomly drawing the training data. Figure E.3 reports the average perplexity
computed on the test data across these ten draws. Lower values indicate better goodness-of-fit.
As we increase the number of pure behaviors from K = 2, we can indeed better fit time-use
patterns, as can be seen from the decreasing perplexity. Naturally, the most parsimonious model
does not account for all the underlying correlations in the high-dimensional feature space. At
the same time, the improvement in fit levels o↵ fairly quickly, and the average perplexity stays
essentially flat from K = 5 through K = 25 before subsequently increasing. This increase is due
to the fact that high values of K capture correlations specific to the training data that do not
generalize to test data.
For illustrative purposes, we choose to analyze K = 11, where average perplexity achieves a
local minimum, although K = 18 corresponds to the global minimum (the di↵erence is merely 0.25
and the interpretation di culties forK = 11 will a fortiori become more severe forK = 18). Rather
than describing behavior with a single index, the K = 11 model yields a ten-dimensional vector
that describes CEO behavior (we omit the probability associated with the sixth pure behavior).
We use this in place of the behavioral index in the regression model of column (1) of table 1. The
point estimates and confidence intervals are displayed in figure E.4.
An initial result is that an F-test for the joint significance of the variables is highly signifi-
cant, which implies that the underlying heterogeneity in the probability of choosing di↵erent pure
behaviors among CEOs is important for explaining di↵erences in firm performance. In terms of
individual coe cients, eight are significantly negative relative to the sixth pure behavior, while two
are not significantly di↵erent.
To gain more insight into what di↵erences these capture, we first compare each pure behavior in
the K = 11 model to pure behavior 0 in the baseline model by computing their Hellinger distance.
This is a standard metric in the information theory literature, and lies in the [0, 1] interval. We then
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Figure E.3: Perplexity for Di↵erent Numbers of Pure Behaviors
282	
284	
286	
288	
290	
292	
294	
296	
298	
300	
302	
K=
2	
K=
3	
K=
4	
K=
5	
K=
6	
K=
7	
K=
8	
K=
9	
K=
10
	
k=
11
	
K=
12
	
K=
13
	
K=
14
	
K=
15
	
K=
16
	
K=
17
	
K=
18
	
K=
19
	
K=
20
	
K=
21
	
K=
23
	
K=
24
	
K=
25
	
K=
30
	
K=
35
	
K=
40
	
K=
45
	
K=
50
	
Notes: This graph plots the average perplexity computed on test data from ten randomly drawn
sets of training data. The split between training data and test data is two-thirds / one-third. Lower
values of perplexity indicate better goodness-of-fit. There are gaps in the values for K due to save
on computation time.
transform the distances by computing their z-values, and also standardize the estimated coe cients
in the productivity regression (treating the coe cient on pure behavior six as zero). Figure E.5
displays a scatterplot of these two series. There is clearly a positive correlation between distance
from pure behavior 0 in the baseline model and a more positive association with productivity.
Moreover, the behavior closest (furthest) from behavior 0 are among those least (most) associated
with high firm performance. In this way, the behavioral di↵erences in the K = 11 model appear
to capture many of the important di↵erences that also emerge from a more parsimonious model.
At the same time, interpreting the content of each separate behavior is di cult, which serves to
highlight the choice of K = 2 on the grounds of simplicity.
E.3 CEO Behavior Index and Management Practices
E.3.1 Management Data
We were able to match the CEO behavior index with information on management practices for
191 firms in our sample. The data are drawn from the World Management Survey (WMS).46 This
uses an interview-based evaluation tool that defines 18 basic management practices and scores them
from one (“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”) on a scoring grid. This evaluation tool was first
developed by an international consulting firm, and scores these practices in three broad areas. First,
Monitoring : how well do companies track what goes on inside their firms, and use this for continuous
improvement? Second, Target setting : do companies set the right targets, track outcomes, and
take appropriate action if the two are inconsistent? Third, Incentives/people management : are
46More details can be found at http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/
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Figure E.4: Coe cient Estimates for Model with Eleven Pure Behaviors
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Notes: This graph plots the coe cient estimates for the productivity regression in column (1) of
table 1 when we replace the scalar behavioral index with the output of the model with K = 11.
The omitted category is the probability put on the sixth pure behavior. The dots represent point
estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals.
Figure E.5: Hellinger Distance from Pure Behavior 0 vs. Coe cient in Productivity Regression
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companies promoting and rewarding employees based on performance, and systematically trying to
hire and retain their best employees? The survey was targeted at plant managers, who are senior
enough to have an overview of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from
day-to-day operations.
The data is collected through interviews with production plant managers using a “double-
blind” technique. One part of this technique is that managers are not told in advance they are
being scored or shown the scoring grid. They are only told they are being “interviewed about
management practices for a piece of work”. The other side of the double blind technique is that
the interviewers do not know anything about the performance of the firm. To survey is based
on “open” questions. For example, on the first monitoring question we start by asking the open
question, “tell me how your monitor your production process”, rather than closed questions such
as “Do you monitor your production daily? [yes/no]”. We continue with open questions focused on
actual practices and examples until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the firm’s
practices. For example, the second question on that performance tracking dimension is, “What
kinds of measures would you use to track performance?” and the third is “If I walked around
your factory, could I tell how each person was performing?”.47 The other side of the double-blind
technique is that interviewers are not told anything about the firm’s performance in advance. They
are only provided with the company name, telephone number, and industry. Since the WMS
randomly samples medium-sized manufacturing firms (employing between 50 and 5,000 workers)
who are not usually reported in the business press, the interviewers will generally have not heard
of these firms before, so they should have few preconceptions.
E.3.2 Management and CEO Behavior
We look at the cross sectional correlation between the management data and the CEO behavior
index in Table E.3. Columns 1 shows that the two variables are positively correlated (all regressions
include log employment, country dummies and a set of noise controls). Columns 2 and 3 show that
the correlation is stronger for the operational subcomponents of the management score, while
they are positive but insignificant for the questions in the survey measuring people management
processes. In columns 4-6 we investigate the relationship between firm performance, management
and CEO behavior. This shows that the two indices are positively and independently correlated
with firm productivity.
47The full list of questions for the grid can be found at http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/wp-
content/images/2010/09/Manufacturing-Survey-Instrument.pdf.
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Table E.3: CEO Behavior Index and Management Practices
Table 6: CEO Behavior, Management and Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable
CEO behavior index 0.606** 0.550*
(0.277) (0.280)
Management (z-score) 0.054* 0.207** 0.187**
(0.030) (0.082) (0.075)
Operations, Monitoring, Targets (z-score) 0.057*
(0.029)
People (zscore) 0.043
(0.034)
log(employment) 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.848*** 0.880*** 0.843***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.093) (0.067) (0.075)
Number of firms 191 191 191 142 142 142
CEO behavior index Log(sales)
Note: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All columns include industry
dummies and a restricted set of noise controls. Columns (1) to (3) include country dummies. Columns (4) to (6)
include also year dummies. "Management" is the standardized value of the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
management score, "Operations, Monitoring and Targets" and "People" are subcomponents of the main
management score. Noise controls are a reliability score assigned by the interviewer at the end of the survey week
and a dummy taking value one if the data was collected through the PA of the CEO, rather than the CEO himself, as
well a variable capturing the reliability of the management score (as assessed by the interviewer) and the duration of
the management interview. In columns (4) to (6) we include at most 5 years of data for each firm and build a simple
average across output and all inputs over this period. Industry controls are 1 digit SIC dummies. All columns
weighted by the week representativeness score assigned by the CEO at the end of the interview week. Errors
clustered at the 2 digit SIC level.
Notes: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Columns (1)
to (3) include country dummies. Columns (4) to (6) includ also year dummies. ”Management”
is the standardized value of the Blo m and Van Reenen (2007) management score, ”Operations,
Monitoring and Targets” and ”People” are subcomponents of the main management score. Noise
controls are a reliability score assigned by the interviewer at the end of the survey week and a
dummy taking value one if the data was collected through the PA of the CEO, rather than the
CEO himself, as well variable capturing the reliability of the management score (as assessed by
the interviewer) and the duration of the m nagement interview. In columns (4) to (6) we include
at most 5 years of data for each firm and build a simple average across output and all inputs
over this period. Industry controls are 1 digit SIC dummies. All columns weighted by the week
representativeness score assigned by the CEO at the end of the interview week. Errors clustered
at the 2 digit SIC level.
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